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Beyond Fukushima:
Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy Law


Lincoln L. Davies

I. INTRODUCTION
Fukushima changed everything. That, at least, was a popular
view espoused after the disaster of March 11, 2011—in the press, by
the talking heads in the international media, and across the
blogosphere.1 A nuclear meltdown in such a densely populated, welldeveloped nation could scarcely do anything less than utterly
transform how nuclear energy would be seen, used, and not used for
years to come.
That was the immediate reaction. As we inch away in time from
the epicenter of the nuclear crisis at Fukushima Daiichi, however, the
picture has become less stark than it often was painted in the days
and weeks after the earthquake sounded, the tsunami struck, and a
series of misjudgments, miscalculations, and chain reactions led to a
partial meltdown of the Fukushima No. 1 power plant.

 Associate Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I
thank Brigham Daniels and Lisa Grow Sun for their invitation to participate in this symposium,
Joe Tomain for very helpful comments on an earlier draft, Jake Warner for his insight into
planning as a tool, and the staff of the BYU Law Review, especially Mike Cannon and Joseph
Walker, for their excellent work and patience.
1. See, e.g., Eun Young Chough, Fukushima Disaster: An End to the Nuclear
Renaissance?, ASIA-PAC. BUS. & TECH. REP. (June 8, 2011), http://www.biztechreport.com/
story/1349-fukushima-disaster-end-nuclear-renaissance (“Whether the Fukushima disaster will
signal the demise of the nuclear renaissance remains unclear, but countries will certainly
continue to take measures to find ways to lessen their dependency on nuclear energy.”); Eben
Harrell, Fukushima: The End of the Nuclear Renaissance?, TIME (Mar. 14, 2011, 2:17 PM),
http://tinyurl.com/4nzv2zc (“As the continent watches in horror as Japanese officials
scramble to prevent meltdown at three nuclear reactors in Northern Japan, countries that were
once at the vanguard of a nuclear renaissance have begun to rethink and even, in some cases,
reverse, their policies on nuclear power.”); Kevin Voigt & Irene Chapple, Fukushima and the
‘Nuclear Renaissance’ that Wasn’t, CNN (Apr. 15, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/15/fukushima-and-the-nuclear-renaissance-thatwasnt/ (“A month after a devastating earthquake sent a wall of water across the Japanese
landscape, the global terrain of the atomic power industry has been forever altered.”).
.
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Nuclear power long has occupied a precarious position in our
collective energy landscape. “Our country, indeed the world, has
always viewed nuclear power with fear and fascination.”2 When a
tragedy like Fukushima transpires, this fear and fascination spike.
Though the harnessing of atoms to create electricity turned “swords
into plowshares” long ago,3 there remains a view today that nuclear
power—and its proponents—are “clearly evil.”4 Nuclear disasters like
Fukushima create an opportunity for those who hold such views to
advocate for a new energy course: one that abandons this energy
source.
Indeed, in the months after Fukushima, some nations announced
their decision to forsake nuclear energy, Germany most prominent
among them.5 Others, like Japan, weighed the idea, only to
subsequently reject it,6 at least for the time being. By contrast, in the
United States the non-nuclear option received little national political
attention.7 Why?
This Article takes up the tragedy at Fukushima Daiichi as a
vehicle for parsing the role that disasters play in nuclear energy
policy—and, by extension, in U.S. energy law generally. In the
public discourse, energy law often orbits disasters. No one talks
about our oil dependence until there is an Exxon Valdez or a
Deepwater Horizon, and then it is conversation fodder for Starbucks
runs. We flip switches all day long without wondering where our
electrons come from, and then there is a Chernobyl, or Three Mile
Island, or Fukushima, and anti-nuclear protestors take to the streets.8
2. Joseph P. Tomain, Nuclear Futures, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 225
(2005).
3. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S.
190, 193–94 (1983).
4. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Stopping Nuclear Power Plants: A Memoir, 21 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
35, 36 (2010).
5. Italy and Switzerland are the other prominent examples of nations that appear
poised to join Germany in abandoning nuclear power post-Fukushima. See Daniel Aldrich,
Nuclear Power’s Future in Japan and Abroad: The Fukushima Accident in Social and Political
Perspective, PARISTECH REVIEW (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.paristechreview.com/
2011/08/25/nuclear-fukushima-accident-social-political-perspective/.
6. See infra Part III.C.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Japan Crisis Could Rekindle U.S. Antinuclear Movement,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/
19/science/earth/19antinuke.html; Justin McCurry, Fukushima Protesters Urge Japan to
Abandon Nuclear Power, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2011, 8:48 AM), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/19/fukushima-protesters-japan-nuclear-power.
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“Energy policy-making in the United States is a cyclical enterprise,”
Gary Bryner observed a decade ago.9 When there is a crisis on the
news, “energy dominates the political agenda.”10 When there is not,
“it fades into the background.”11 Energy disasters thus hold a
tenuous relationship with energy policymaking. They create
opportunities for change,12 but they also risk misdirecting the debate
away from the truly important questions.
This Article posits that energy disasters in the United States tend
to perpetuate both of these effects. They often cause change, but this
change tends to be incremental. At the same time, by “solving” the
proximate causes of the disasters—and those causes alone—these
modifications to energy law obfuscate the need to look more deeply
at the underlying, root causes of our energy dilemmas.13
These phenomena are largely a result of the dominant energy
paradigm that dictates our energy laws and policy today.14 To
mitigate the role that disasters play in shaping our law, disasters must
be deemphasized as clarions for change. Alone, however, this will
not be enough. A fundamental shift in our energy policy objectives
and processes also is needed. By using nuclear energy itself as a
metaphor for conceptualizing how U.S. energy law functions, this
Article suggests that there are two primary changes that should be
made to our system of energy governance. First, the goals of energy
law should be realigned to reflect greater emphasis on sustainability.
Second, energy law should employ more, and more robust, planning.
Making these changes will not be easy. Nor will they solve our
9. Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 341, 341 (2002).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. This, of course, is not unique to energy law. As Professor Hannah Wiseman has
noted, “courts or legislatures often create law in reaction to events, rather than anticipating
them.” Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables
Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 827 (2011).
13. See, e.g., Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 414 (1995) (“Environmental regulation is also needlessly complicated
because it developed as Congress reacted to the environmental crisis of each particular year.”);
William H. Rodgers, Jr. & Anna T. Moritz, The Worst Case and the Worst Example: An Agenda
for Any Young Lawyer Who Wants to Save the World From Climate Chaos, 17 SOUTHEASTERN
ENVTL. L.J. 295, 332 (2009) (“U.S. environmental law is already well-schooled in strategies of
too late, long-since-gone, triage, sacrifice zones, and reluctance to send ‘good money after
bad.’”); Amy J. Wildermuth, The Legacy of Exxon Valdez: How Do We Stop the Crisis?, 7 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 130, 131 (2009) (noting environmental law’s “triage approach”).
14. See infra Part V.A.
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energy problems in toto. But they would improve our law, and thus,
potentially our society as well.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes the meltdown
at Fukushima. Part III summarizes three countries’ political and
regulatory responses to the disaster: Germany, the United States, and
Japan. Part IV conceptualizes U.S. energy law and its relation to
energy disasters, using nuclear energy as a metaphor. Part V
addresses critiques of our extant system of energy policy and possible
responses thereto, including what such changes may mean for the
future of nuclear energy in the United States. Part VI concludes.
II. CHAIN REACTION
“Crying is useless. If we’re in hell now all we can do is to crawl
up towards heaven.”15 This was what one worker participating in the
cleanup at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station 170 miles
north of Tokyo wrote in an email barely three weeks after the
disaster began.
The email captured the mood. Descriptions of Fukushima’s
aftermath hardly lacked for incantations of the severe. With a
decommissioning process that may take as many as three decades to
finalize,16 portrayals of the meltdown and ensuing cleanup at this
“campus larger than the Pentagon’s”17 as embodying a
“nightmare
scenario”19—even
“chaos . . .
“remarkable,”18
20
explosions, fires, ruptures” —were not in short supply. “For nuclear

15. Letters from Fukushima: Tepco Worker Emails, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 28, 2011, 8:21
PM), http://tinyurl.com/5skvh2l (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Early reports suggested that decommissioning would take a full decade. See, e.g.,
Krista Mahr, A Month After the Earthquake, the Crisis Continues and the Questions Mount,
TIME, Apr. 11, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/3u3b3jd; O.M., Piecing Together Fukushima,
ECONOMIST (May 5, 2011, 8:53 AM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/
05/japans_nuclear_disaster. More recent estimates by an expert panel enlisted by Japan’s
Atomic Energy Commission put the figure at closer to thirty years. Experts Say It Will Take at
Least 30 Years to Close Japan’s Tsunami-Hit Nuclear Power Plant, WASH. POST, Oct. 30,
2011, http://tinyurl.com/66nzl6f.
17. Evan Osnos, The Fallout: Letter from Fukushima: Seven Months Later: Japan’s
Nuclear Predicament, NEW YORKER, Oct. 17, 2011, at 46, 46.
18. O.M., supra note 16.
19. Simon Shuster, Fire at Fourth Reactor: Is Worse Yet to Come in the Fukushima
Nuclear Disaster?, TIME, Mar. 15, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/
0,8599,2059232,00.html.
20. Michael Grunwald, The Real Cost of U.S. Nuclear Power, TIME, Mar. 25, 2011,

1940

DO NOT DELETE

1937

12/20/2011 3:08 PM

Beyond Fukushima

evacuees,” one reporter wrote, “the very idea of rebuilding [the city
and surrounding region] looks increasingly out of reach. As images
are emerging from the deserted zone, where forgotten corpses rest in
situ[,] . . . many evacuees are beginning to wonder when and if
they’ll be able to return.”21 Another reporter observed:
All that’s missing from the area is people. In their place, dogs roam
the streets, abandoned by their owners. Alien figures in radiation
suits, gas masks and respirators peer from passing vehicles. A police
car slows and the two masks inside tell the Sakumas, father and son,
to get quickly to safety. “It’s dangerous here. Please take shelter,
for your own sake.”22

Offering his view of the risk that Fukushima presented in the weeks
after the three active reactors at the plant melted down,23 Robert
Alvarez, a former U.S. Department of Energy official, was far
blunter: “I’d get my butt on an airplane and get out of Japan.”24
For all the quickness to employ end-of-days imagery in
describing the scene at Fukushima, however, details of precisely what
went wrong at the plant were slower to emerge. Initially, only one
thing was clear: the “double whammy” of the 9.0 earthquake and
enormous tsunami that hit northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011
triggered the crisis.25 The earthquake caused “the automatic
shutdown of 11 reactors at four sites” along Japan’s northeast
coast.26 At Fukushima Daiichi, it took the plant off the grid, cutting
off the electric power supply for its cooling systems.27 Then, the
tsunami disabled the semitruck-sized, diesel-fired backup generators
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2059603,00.html.
21. Mahr, supra note 16.
22. David McNeill, Fukushima No. 1’s Scary Shadow: Bucolic Farm Belt Now No-Go Zone
of Radioactivity, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/
nn20110331f1.html.
23. 2011 Japan Nuclear Crisis: Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011,
http://tinyurl.com/6fqn5xh [hereinafter Overview] (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Jeffrey Kluger, Fear Goes Nuclear, TIME, Mar. 28, 2011, http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,2059639,00.html.
25. Howard Chua-Eoan, How to Stop a Nuclear Meltdown, TIME, Mar 12, 2011,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058615,00.html. The tsunami was not a
single wave but a “first large” wave that was “followed by multiple additional waves.” U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, FACT SHEET ON SUMMARY OF MARCH 2011 JAPAN
EVENTS AND NRC RESPONSE (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/fs-japan-events.html [hereinafter “NRC FACT SHEET”].
26. NRC FACT SHEET, supra note 25.
27. Chua-Eoan, supra note 25; O.M., supra note 16; Overview, supra note 23.
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that were designed to step in and keep the reactor cores cool by
continuing water circulation.28 Fukushima was built with the
expectation that a tsunami could strike. Yet the original estimate was
that a 3.1-meter wave might hit; in 2002, that prediction was
upgraded to a 5.7 meters. The March 11 tsunami was roughly 15
meters high, flooding the backup generators located on the ground
floor and in the basements of the plant.29 Fukushima “had been built
with large shutters facing the sea.”30 As the tsunami arrived,
however, water
burst through the closed shutters and swamped the buildings. . . .
[It] hurled pickup trucks pinwheeling end over end into delicate
pipes and equipment, . . . swamp[ing] the campus in roiling brown
pools, fifteen feet deep, leaving the nuclear reactors protruding like
boulders in a river. And then it recoiled into the sea.31

After the cooling systems stopped, the reactor cores began to
overheat. This led to what could only be described as “surreal” sights
at the facility: “two helicopters from the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces hover[ing] above the crippled Reactor 3[,] . . . a huge red
bucket carrying tons of seawater swaying beneath each[,]. . .
dumping a total of seven tons of seawater into a depleted pool of
water housing the spent fuel rods,” while on the ground “the SelfDefense Forces moved 11 trucks bearing water cannons into position
to aid in the cooling effort.”32 Eventually, these “last-ditch,” “Hail
Mary pass”33 efforts at avoiding catastrophe failed. Hydrogen gas
became trapped inside the facilities, causing fires and explosions that
damaged three of the main Fukushima buildings.34 A separate fire
also occurred in Building 4, which stored spent fuel rods in a cooling
pond.35

28. O.M., supra note 16; Chua-Eoan, supra note 25; Osnos, supra note 17, at 48;
Overview, supra note 23.
29. O.M., supra note 16; Osnos, supra note 17, at 48.
30. Osnos, supra note 17, at 48.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Chua-Eoan, supra note 25.
34. O.M., supra note 16; Hiroko Tabuchi, Keith Bradsher, & Matthew L. Wald, In
Japan Reactor Failings, Danger Signs for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, at A1, available
at http://tinyurl.com/7z964tn.
35. O.M., supra note 16.
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All this ultimately led to “not merely a double blow but a triple
one”—a chain reaction of chain reactions that caused the worst
nuclear energy incident in the world since Chernobyl.36 Radioactive
gas leaked into the atmosphere, eventually being measured as far
away as Iceland.37 It also hampered cleanup efforts. The explosions
and fires “splattered radioactive and other debris . . . hither and
yon,” obscuring “what the most important sources of radiation
were.”38
The release of radiation forced the evacuation of approximately
86,000 people from around the facility.39 The Japanese government
established a six-mile evacuation perimeter, a perimeter it later
doubled based in part on information it possessed at the time it set
the original emergency zone.40 The government’s back-and-forth on
the appropriate disaster response incited sharp criticism. Early
critiques deemed the Japanese government “arbitrary, unscientific,
even callous” in how it handled the incident.41 Later criticisms were
even more pointed, assessing the government’s performance as
ineffective, shrouded in secrecy, and more concerned about
“avoid[ing] responsibility and, above all, criticism” than about the
safety of its people.42 A May 2011 poll, in fact, revealed just how
deep-seated this distrust was; it showed that north of eighty percent
of Japanese people “did not believe the[ir] government’s
information” about the disaster.43 With some residents being
evacuated to areas directly in the line of what government models
36. Id.; see also Beth Thomas, Fukushima Plant Released Record Amount of Radiation
Into
Ocean,
SFGATE.COM
(Oct.
31,
2011),
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2011/10/31/bloomberg_articlesLTWZKG6KLVR4.DTL (“Tokyo
Electric’s Fukushima station may have emitted . . . 35,800 terabecquerels of cesium 137 into
the atmosphere at the height of the disaster . . . . The estimated amount is about 42 percent of
that released into the atmosphere in the Chernobyl explosion in 1986 . . . .”).
37. Overview, supra note 23.
38. O.M., supra note 16.
39. Overview, supra note 23; Sayonara, Nukes, but Not Yet; An Anti-Nuclear Protest in
Japan, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2011, at 52, available at http://www.economist.com/node/
21530147.
40. Eric Talmadge & Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Ignored Own Radiation Forecasts, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/9/japanignored-own-radiation-forecasts/?page=all.
41. McNeill, supra note 22.
42. Norimitsu Onishi & Martin Fackler, Japan Held Nuclear Data, Leaving Evacuees in
Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/
09/world/asia/09japan.html?pagewanted=all.
43. Osnos, supra note 17, at 57–58.
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had predicted to be the path of radiation exposure, at least one local
official went so far as to accuse the national government of acts
equivalent to “murder.”44 Kiwamu Ariga, an 81-year-old who at the
end of World War II was enlisted as a child to search by hand for
uranium for the Japanese atomic effort, certainly saw nefariousness in
the government’s response: “We were brainwashed during the war,
and we were brainwashed again after the war. Maybe we will get wise
the third time.”45
Motives aside, what was clear about the response to Fukushima’s
demise was that confusion reigned. As evening crept on March 11,
workers at the plant were forced to go to nearby homes to ask for
flashlights so they could see inside the plant.46 The plant’s operators
were unprepared. “There was hesitation, arguments and sheer
confusion over what to do.”47 The pressure inside Reactor No. 1
reached twice its design limit shortly after the earthquake struck. The
government thus ordered the plant’s operator, Tokyo Electric Power
(“TEPCO”), to begin venting gas off the reactor, but the company
refused, with its employees engaging in a “shouting match” over
what course of action was most appropriate.48 As a consequence, one
reactor meltdown began only hours after the tsunami hit.49 The
government, meanwhile, refused to admit the extremity of the crisis.
On the night of the tsunami, then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan’s
spokesperson, Yukio Edano, declared: “Let me repeat that there is
no radiation leak, nor will there be a leak.”50 Ultimately, the
Japanese government officially acknowledged the meltdown—but
not until two months after it occurred.51
Blame did not rest solely with the government, however. It cut
multiple ways. Preparations at the plant were so poor that workers
attempting to grapple with the initial loss of power became so
“desperate for electricity . . . they fanned out into the parking lot to
44. Onishi & Fackler, supra note 42.
45. Martin Fackler, Fukushima’s Long Link to a Dark Nuclear Past, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2011, at A10 (quoting Mr. Ariga) (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Osnos, supra note 17, at 50.
47. Tabuchi, Bradsher, & Wald, supra note 34 (quoting an anonymous government
advisor) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id.
49. Bright Ideas Needed: Japan’s Power Monopolies Raise Costs and Stifle Innovation,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2011, at 65 [hereinafter Bright Ideas Needed].
50. Osnos, supra note 17, at 48.
51. Bright Ideas Needed, supra note 49, at 65.
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scavenge car batteries from any vehicles that had survived the
wave.”52 At one point early in the crisis, Prime Minister Kan,
frustrated with TEPCO’s withholding of information, stormed into
the company’s headquarters, screaming, “What the hell is going
on?”53 When Kan later flew to the facility to see what was happening
for himself, the plant manager reportedly offered to “form a suicide
squad” to open the vent in Reactor No. 1.54 As United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Gregory Jaczko would
later comment about his early frustration with the Japanese
government’s apparent refusal to share information with his agency,
“[i]t wasn’t a question of them not providing the information to
us . . . . The information just didn’t exist.”55
The failure to contain Fukushima resulted in substantial
environmental contamination. The scope of immediate fallout was so
vast it included an area as large as Chicago.56 The most contaminated
area, the ten miles immediately around the plant, likely will be
uninhabitable for a century-and-a-half,57 but the “vagaries of wind
and rain . . . scattered worrisome amounts of radioactive materials in
unexpected patterns far outside the evacuation zone”—including
creating radiation hotspots in Tokyo, 160 miles away.58
Plants, crops, livestock, and water in the region all were
contaminated with radioactive materials. Six months after the
meltdowns, local fishermen and cattle farmers were still banned from
selling their yields.59 Some crops were tested and cleared for
consumption, although radiation was found in many “local foods
like shitake mushrooms, bamboo shoots, fish, beef, and spinach,” to
name only a few.60 The overall result was prevailing uncertainty.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Naoto Kan) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. Osnos, supra note 17, at 50.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 58.
57. Id. at 53.
58. Hiroko Tabuchi, Citizens’ Testing Finds 20 Hot Spots Around Tokyo, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/world/asia/radioactive-hot-spotsin-tokyo-point-to-wider-problems.html?pagewanted=all.
59. Krista Mahr, A Long Road to Recovery, TIME, Aug. 29, 2011,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2089361,00.html [hereinafter Mahr,
A Long Road].
60. Krista Mahr, Do I Dare to Eat a Peach? Fukushima Citizens and Farmers Struggle
with Food Safety, ECOCENTRIC (Aug. 8, 2011, 1:50 AM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/
2011/08/08/do-i-dare-to-eat-a-peach-fukushima-citizens-and-farmers-struggle-with-food-
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“The exact amount and degree of contamination is still unknown.”61
A half-year after the explosions at the reactors, work remained
ongoing to strip local land of contaminated soil; at the same time,
citizen measurements showed that three-quarters of tested schools
exceeded the yearly limit of radiation exposure for employees at
Japanese nuclear power plants.62 One government estimate
suggested that nearly 2500 square kilometers of contaminated soil
would need to be cleared—an area bigger than Tokyo itself.63
Consequently, the region, once a “picture-postcard”64 tourist
destination well known for its “verdant rice paddies and mountain
hot springs,”65 a place with the “feel of Maine: organic farms, pine
forests, coastal towns where the air is spiked with sea salt,”66 became
home to scores of “nuclear gypsies” who traveled from across the
country to work on the cleanup.67 As one report put it, “anyone who
isn’t [in Fukushima] on business simply isn’t there.”68
Ultimately, for the people of Fukushima and Japan more
broadly, this lingering uncertainty may be the disaster’s most
enduring legacy. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency
confirmed that the site had become “essentially stable” six months
after the tragedy began,69 doubts about the area’s future remain. A
month into the disaster, the event was provisionally escalated to a
“level seven” nuclear incident, the highest level possible.70 Half a

safety/ [hereinafter Mahr, Do I Dare]; Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59.
61. Mahr, Do I Dare, supra note 60.
62. Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59.
63. Radiation in Japan: Hot Spots and Blind Spots: The Mounting Human Costs of
Japan’s Nuclear Disaster, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/
21531522/print.
64. McNeill, supra note 22.
65. Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59.
66. Osnos, supra note 17, at 55.
67. Justin McCurry, Fukushima Cleanup Recruits ‘Nuclear Gypsies’ from Across Japan,
GUARDIAN (July 13, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/
2011/jul/13/fukushima-nuclear-gypsies-engineers-labourers. One report noted that many of
these workers make the equivalent of 11 dollars per hour—”the same as part-time help at
McDonald’s in Tokyo.” Osnos, supra note 17, at 55.
68. Mahr, A Long Road, supra note 59.
69. Fredrik Dahl, Fukushima Reactors Now ‘Stable,’ IAEA Says, REUTERS (Sept. 12,
2011, 2:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/12/us-nuclear-japan-iaeaidUSTRE78B5D020110912.
70. Matt Smith, Japan Nuclear Agency Raises Threat Level, CNN (Apr. 11, 2011, 11:11
PM), http://tinyurl.com/3tknwsb.
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year later, “the Fukushima accident isn’t over.”71 A late 2011 report
suggested that the disabled reactors may still be experiencing “bursts
of fission,” releasing yet more radioactivity.72 Trying to quell fears
that cleanup efforts were ineffective at decontaminating water at the
site, a government official in November took the dare of a journalist,
went on television, and drank half a glass of water collected from the
reactor buildings.73 The Japanese government also recently
acknowledged that over three dozen sensors within the twelve-mileradius evacuation zone surrounding the plant have recorded aboveacceptable radiation levels, meaning that much of the area will
remain evacuated indefinitely—for decades at least.74 “We cannot
deny a possibility that some of the residents may not be able to
return to their homes for a long time,” acknowledged Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yukio Edano in an August news conference.75 “We are very
sorry.”76
III. THREE RESPONSES
The destruction and devastation that Fukushima’s meltdown
unleashed was horrific: a tragedy heaped on a tragedy and, worse
still, an avoidable one. On this the facts are not debatable.
Where there is controversy is on the appropriate policy response
to the disaster. It is hardly surprising that each nation might mark its
own particular path in determining how to deal with nuclear power
post-Fukushima. Considering, however, the reaction of three
countries shows just how divergent political responses to energy
disasters can be. For Germany, the United States, and Japan, the
reactions to Fukushima hardly could have been more different.

71. Remarks of Peter Bradford, Adjunct Professor, Vermont Law School, Nuclear
Safety—Expecting the Unexpected, 19th Section Fall Meeting: The ABA Environment,
Energy, and Resources Law Summit, Section of Enviroment, Energy, and Resources, Am. Bar
Ass’n, Indianapolis, Indiana (Oct. 13, 2011) (notes in possession of author).
72. Hiroko Tabuchi, Fears of Fission Rise at Stricken Japanese Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/world/asia/bursts-of-fission-detected-atfukushima-reactor-in-japan.html?pagewanted=all.
73. Robert Mackey & Ravi Somaiya, Japanese Official Drinks Water from Fukushima
Reactor Buildings, N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE (Nov. 1, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/3qzm97a.
74. Martin Fackler, Large Zone Near Japanese Reactors to Be Off Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2011, at A6; Mari Yamaguchi, Some Areas Near Japan’s Crippled Nuke Plant to
Remain Off-limits for Foreseeable Future, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 22, 2011.
75. Yamaguchi, supra note 74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A. Germany
“There is German angst about nuclear power.”77
Germany, to be sure, long has been antipathetic to atomic
energy, despite its making up nearly a quarter of the nation’s
electricity production. Since at least the 1970s, smiling yellow-andred suns brandishing the slogan “Atomkraft? Neine, danke” have
been cultural fixtures in Germany.78 Indeed, the left-leaning antinuclear activists of the 1970s who so staunchly opposed Germany’s
use of nuclear energy were in large part the precursors to the nation’s
now politically powerful Green Party.79
Still, in the months leading up to Fukushima’s failure, nuclear
energy appeared to have at least some staying power in Germany. In
late 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel brokered a deal to
extend the lives of the nation’s seventeen active nuclear power plants
by twelve years.80 The plan, which Merkel called a “revolution in
energy provision”81 to keep nuclear “desirable as a bridging
technology”82 was not without controversy, but it also was seen as a
way to help cement Germany’s position as an economic and
environmental leader. The environmental aspect was obvious given
Germany’s growing renewables sector83 and nuclear’s own climate

77. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Germany Dims Nuclear Plants, but Hopes to Keep Lights On,
N.Y TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/science/earth/
30germany.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Hildegard Cornelius-Guas) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
78. Sabine Rennefanz, Merkel Spins Round to Lead Germany’s Anti-nuclear Movement,
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2011, 11:04 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/
jun/01/angela-merkel-germany-nuclear-power. This German phrase translates to “Nuclear
power? No, thank you.” See Paul Hockenos, Atomkraft? Neine Danke!, PROGRESSIVE (August
2011), http://progressive.org/atomkraft_nein_nuclear_power.html.
79. Daniel Johnson, Why Germany Said No to Nuclear Power, TELEGRAPH (May 30,
2011,
8:37
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/
8546608/Why-Germany-said-no-to-nuclear-power.html.
80. Kate Connolly, Germany Agrees to Extend Life of Nuclear Power Stations,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2010, 9:59 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/06/
germany-extend-nuclear-power-stations.
81. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Kate Connolly, Angela Merkel Risks Germans’ Ire with Fresh Commitment to Nuclear
Energy, GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2010, 1:35 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
aug/30/angela-merkel-commits-nuclear-energy (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See, e.g., Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854, 1859
(2008); Toby Couture & Yves Gagnon, An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Remuneration Models:
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change benefits.84 Likewise, many suggested that the decision to
keep nuclear power running put nothing less than Germany’s energy
independence on the line: “We urgently need to keep the plants up
and running for longer,” Merkel said.85 “I am against shutting down
our nuclear power plants only to have atomic power imported into
Germany from other countries. . . . That won’t happen on my
watch.”86
How much can change in a day. In Fukushima’s wake, antinuclear sentiment in Germany surged to all-time highs, and
Chancellor Merkel swiftly caved to the pressure. Not weeks or
months but mere days after the tsunami struck Japan, Merkel
announced that the government would order the shutdown of
Germany’s seven nuclear power plants built before 1980.87 Then, in
yet a further blow to the industry, the German government
announced that it would phase out its remaining ten reactors, so that
after 2022 no nuclear power plant would operate in Germany.88
“Safety has the priority in all our deliberations,” Merkel declared.89
Norbert Röttgen, Merkel’s environment minister, was even starker.
“It’s definite: the latest end for the last three nuclear power plants is
2022. . . . There will be no clause for revision.”90
Together, these two decisions made Germany’s the harshest of
reactions to Fukushima Daiichi. In the span of a decade, this heavily
industrialized nation planned to transform its electric economy,
eliminating nearly a quarter of its generation supply and using
Implications for Renewable Energy Investment, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 955, 956–60 (2010); Marc
Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union: The Race Between Feedin Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 11 (2006).
84. See, e.g., RONALD E. HAGEN ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, IMPACT OF U.S.
NUCLEAR GENERATION ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 5 (Nov. 1, 2001) (reporting zero
CO2 emissions during the operation of a nuclear plant compared to 0.266 metric tons/MWh
for coal), available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/-nuclear/ghg.pdf .
85. Charles Lane, Merkel’s Flip-flop Logic, WASH. POST (June 7, 2011, 4:05 PM),
http://tinyurl.com/7g6np6t (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Johnson, supra note 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Luke Harding, Angela Merkel Switches Off Seven Nuclear Power Plants, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 15, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/15/germanymerkel-switches-nuclear-power-off.
88. Germany Pledges Nuclear Shutdown by 2022, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2011, 5:24 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/30/germany-pledges-nuclear-shutdown2022.
89. Harding, supra note 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Germany Pledges Nuclear Shutdown by 2022, supra note 88 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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massive expansion of renewables, new coal- and gas-fired plants, and
aggressive efficiency measures to make up the gap. This perhaps was
not entirely because of Fukushima, but there also was no denying
that the change was a direct, proximate result of the meltdown of a
single power plant on the other side of the globe.
The German decision was met with great domestic fanfare.
Whereas a poll showed fifty-six percent of Germans opposing the
extension of nuclear plants’ lives in 2010,91 the phaseout-by-2022
proposal rushed through the German legislature: eighty-five percent
of parliamentarians supported the move,92 and the vote in the lower
house was an overwhelming 513-79.93
Choosing to shut down nuclear power in Germany, however, did
not go entirely without dissent. Many in the international
community—and a vociferous minority at home, too—blasted
Merkel for what in the United States would have been labeled a clear
political “flip flop.”94 “Yes, this lady is for turning! For spinning,
indeed,” wrote the United Kingdom’s Guardian.95 Others likewise
noted the irony of this nuclear “turnaround,”96 calling it, among
other things, “emotional,”97 “a spectacular about-turn,”98 “a drastic
policy reversal,”99 “politically motivated [for] tactical reasons
alone,”100 “[b]acktracking in the blink of an eye,”101 and a measure
that would force an “extreme energy makeover” for the entire
nation.102 Hans-Jürgen Papier, former president of Germany’s
Federal Constitutional Court, cut to the quick: “Angela Merkel, the

91. Connolly, supra note 82.
92. How Germany Plans to Succeed in a Nuclear Free, Low-Carbon Economy, GUARDIAN
(July 29, 2011, 4:31 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/29/
nuclearpower-energy.
93. Germany Votes to End Nuclear Power by 2022, GUARDIAN (June 30, 2011, 2:16
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/30/germany-end-nuclear-power-2022.
94. Lane, supra note 85 (calling Merkel’s changed decision “one of the most blatant
political flip-flops of all time”).
95. Rennefanz, supra note 78.
96. Judy Dempsey, Siemens Abandoning Nuclear Power Business, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/business/global/19iht-siemens19.html.
97. Rosenthal, supra note 77.
98. Germany Votes to End Nuclear Power by 2022, supra note 93.
99. Germany Pledges Nuclear Shutdown by 2022, supra note 88.
100. Thomas Schmid, The Hidden Fallout from Germany’s Sudden Nuclear Shutdown,
TIME, June 2, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2075013,00.html.
101. Id.
102. Rosenthal, supra note 77.
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magician, pulled [this moratorium] out of her hat like a rabbit a
couple of days after Fukushima.”103
“Germany, in a very rash decision, decided to experiment on
ourselves,” Jürgen Grossmann, chief executive of one of Germany’s
largest electricity suppliers, RWE, later said of the ban. “The politics
are overruling the technical arguments.”104 Early on, there appeared
to be at least some truth in this statement. The other German
electricity giant, and Europe’s largest power provider, E.ON,
announced it would slash up to 11,000 jobs and post earnings in the
red as a result of the phaseout.105 Chemical powerhouse Bayer
threatened to relocate production facilities outside the country.106
German manufacturing conglomerate Siemens declared it would no
longer produce nuclear facilities, despite having built all seventeen of
Germany’s.107 Moreover, with such a large swath of plants already off
the grid, threats of winter blackouts loomed.108 And a leading
German bank estimated that the switch from nuclear to renewables
would cost the nation $340 billion over the next decade.109
All this was the case, and perhaps to little avail: since the
shutdown of the seven oldest plants, Germany has met its electricity
demand most days only by importing power from France and the
Czech Republic—both heavy users of nuclear power.110 Still, in
Germany, the answer to Fukushima remained clear: a “death warrant
on nuclear power.”111

103. Schmid, supra note 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Rosenthal, supra note 77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Tom Bawden, German Nuclear Shutdown Forces E.ON to Cut 11,000 Staff,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2011, 1:01 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/aug/
10/german-nuclear-shutdown-forces-eon-to-axe-11000-jobs.
106. Ruby Russell, Bayer Threatens to Quit Germany over Nuclear Shutdown, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 7, 2011, 1:36 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/07/bayer-quitgermany-nuclear-shutdown.
107. Dempsey, supra note 96.
108. Germany Could Restart Nuclear Plant to Plug Energy Gap, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L
(July 13, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,774203,00.html
[hereinafter Germany Could Restart].
109. Nuclear Phaseout to Cost Germany 250 Billion, THE LOCAL (Sept. 19, 2011,
4:05 PM), http://www.thelocal.de/money/20110919-37687.html.
110. Germany May Be Importing Nuclear Power to Meet Energy Needs, SPIEGEL ONLINE
INT’L (Apr. 4, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/3mlka5h.
111. Schmid, supra note 100.
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B. United States
To Germany’s anti-nuclear fervor, the United States matched
caution and deliberateness—a measured, adjust-if-necessary but
change-as-little-as-possible approach.
For a nation whose views on atomic energy have cycled in
polarity over time—thus keeping the American energy stance firmly
in the middle of the nuclear road112—this incrementalist response
hardly should have been a surprise. “Support for nuclear power [in
the United States] has waxed and waned over the decades, going up
as the power-hungry nation looked for ways to meet demand and
driven down by nuclear accidents at home and abroad.”113 With
Fukushima Daiichi, little changed.
U.S. leaders were quick to express concern and condolences for
Japan and to offer support, including sending teams of experts from
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) to assist the Japanese
government.114 But on nuclear power itself, the official policy
remained: steady as she goes. Mere days after the tragedy in Japan
began unfolding, President Obama reiterated America’s commitment
to nuclear power as part of our generation mix. “[N]uclear power,”
he said, was still “an important part of our own energy future.”115 In
testimony before Congress, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu echoed
this view: “That position hasn’t been changed.”116 “To meet our
energy needs . . . the administration believes we must rely on a
diverse set of energy sources including renewables like wind and
solar, natural gas, clean coal and nuclear power.”117
112. See Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman, Nuclear Power Loses Support in New Poll,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23poll.html.
113. Id.
114. Amy Bonaccorso, The NRC Continues to Support Japan’s Recovery Efforts, NRC
BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011), http://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2011/08/01/the-nrc-continuesto-support-japans-recovery-efforts/.
115. Jesse Lee, President Obama: “We Will Stand with the People of Japan,” WHITE
HOUSE BLOG (Mar. 17, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/03/17/
president-obama-we-will-stand-people-japan (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jia
Lynn Yang, Democrats Step Up Pressure on Nuclear Regulators over Disaster Preparedness,
WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2011, 1:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/03/18/AR2011031800115_pf.html.
116. Peter Wallsten & Dan Eggen, U.S. Takes Conservative Approach in Response to
Nuclear Crisis in Japan, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/6rn8r9s (internal
quotation marks omitted).
117. Joshua Green, Washington’s Pro-Nuke Consensus, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2011,
10:54 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/03/washingtons-pro-nuke-
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Instead, what the Obama administration called for was a careful
review of Fukushima’s implications for nuclear energy in the United
States.118 Yet this review was much more circumscribed than it might
have been. Given the administration’s continuing commitment to
atomic energy, big picture questions were off the table. The review
most certainly was not one—as in Germany—of whether reliance on
nuclear power should continue, but rather a much narrower version:
an in-the-weeds inquiry of what specific triggers led to the
meltdowns in Fukushima, whether those same triggers existed in the
United States, and, if so, what should be done to make American
plants operate more safely. “[W]hen we see a crisis like the one in
Japan,” President Obama announced, “we have a responsibility to
learn from this event, and to draw from those lessons to ensure the
safety and security of our people. That’s why I’ve asked the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to do a comprehensive review of the safety
of our domestic nuclear plants in light of [Fukushima].”119
The NRC’s review, in turn, was singularly focused on this
concept: safety. On Capitol Hill, NRC Chairman Gregory Jaczko
repeatedly reassured Congress of the safety of America’s nuclear
generation fleet. “[W]e have been very closely monitoring the
activities in Japan and reviewing all currently available information.
Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection
and licensing oversight, gives us confidence that the U.S. plants
continue to operate safely.”120 Chairman Jaczko also clarified that the
NRC’s post-Fukushima assessment would, consistent with the
agency’s duties, center on the question of operational safety. “The
NRC is systematically and methodically evaluating the lessons being
learned at Fukushima Daiichi as they might apply to the safety of
reactors in the United States . . . .”121
The NRC decided to assess Fukushima’s implications in tiers,
starting with an immediate short-term review, followed by a more inconsensus/72577/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Lee, supra note 115.
119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Written Statement from Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, to Appropriations Comm., Subcomm. on Energy & Water, U.S. Senate 3 (Mar. 30,
2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/6vo7gby.
121. Written Statement from Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, to Env’t & Pub. Works Comm. and Clean Air & Nuclear Safety Subcomm., U.S.
Senate 3 (June 16, 2011), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/congress-docs/congress-testimony/2011/ML11166A256.pdf.
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depth review on a slightly longer timetable, and concluding with a
long-term review once Japan’s own assessment of what happened at
the Daiichi plant was complete. The agency’s middle-term review
culminated in a nearly 100-page report from a task force of six
experts with a combined total of over 135 years of regulatory
experience.122 Their primary conclusion confirmed what both
President Obama and Chairman Jaczko said all along—that while
Fukushima might lead to some reforms of U.S. nuclear regulation,
overall the disaster gave no reason to reconsider domestic reliance on
the technology.
The Task Force finds that the Commission’s longstanding defensein-depth philosophy, supported and modified as necessary by stateof-the-art probabilistic risk assessment techniques, should continue
to serve as the primary organizing principle of its regulatory
framework. . . . [Nevertheless,] a sequence of events like the
Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and
some appropriate mitigation measures have been implemented,
reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases.
Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities
do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety.123

Specifically, the task force recommended twelve overarching
changes to U.S. nuclear regulation.124 None, however, contemplated
closing down plants or halting new construction. Instead, the
recommendations emphasized ways to “clarify” and “strengthen”
existing policy, not replace it.125 Virtually every one of the
suggestions, moreover, was tethered directly to the problems
encountered at Fukushima, rather than asking more broadly if gaps
in NRC regulations existed in general. For instance, the task force
recommended that nuclear operators “reevaluate and upgrade as
necessary [the facilities’] seismic and flooding protection of
structures.”126 Similarly, it urged the strengthening of “station
122. Written Statement from Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, to Env’t & Pub. Works Comm. and Clean Air & Nuclear Safety Subcomm., U.S.
Senate 2 (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1121/
ML11213A279.pdf.
123. CHARLES MILLER ET AL., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY
IN THE 21ST CENTURY vii–viii (2011), available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/
docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf.
124. Id. at ix.
125. Id. at vii.
126. Id. at ix.
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blackout mitigation capability,” requiring “reliable hardened vent
designs” in plants with the same reactor designs as Fukushima
Daiichi’s, and pursuing “additional emergency preparedness topics
related to multiunit events and prolonged station blackout.”127
These political and regulatory assurances notwithstanding,
support for nuclear power in the United States post-Fukushima was
hardly unanimous. A number of environmental groups seized on the
incident as an opportunity to call for the phaseout of atomic
energy.128 Public support for the technology receded to the lowest it
had been since Three Mile Island, dropping nearly fifteen percentage
points from its almost sixty percent approval rating in 2008.129 And
at least some politicians saw in Fukushima Daiichi’s demise new
fraying around the edges of the future of American nuclear power.
Particularly in seismically prone California, some Democrats, such as
Henry Waxman and Barbara Boxer, expressed renewed reservations
about the energy source. “Japan is a technologically capable country,
and they anticipated earthquakes and tsunamis, but still they didn’t
have all the failsafes to stop this tragedy from occurring,”
Representative Waxman noted. “So, we need a full inquiry as to how
this happened, why it happened, what we can do to build in security
features in the United States. Until that happens, we ought to step
back from the direction that Republicans are taking, which is heavily
reliant on nuclear.”130

127. Id. Hardened vents allow for the release of gases from inside the reactor
containment in the case of emergency, such as the loss of power. Plants in the United States
using the same containment structure as that in Fukushima, the GE Mark I, installed hardened
vents in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Daiichi plant also had hardened vents installed;
one aspect of the investigation into the accident is to assess whether these vents performed
sufficiently. See Venting Systems in Mark I Reactors, GE REPORTS (May 25, 2011),
http://www.gereports.com/venting-systems-in-mark-i-reactors/; see also MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 123, at 40–41.
128. See Kaufman, supra note 8; The Nuclear Crisis in Japan, FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
http://www.foe.org/nuclear-crisis-japan (last visited Nov. 1, 2011); see also Eileen
O’Grady & Scott DiSavino, Groups Step Up Call for NRC Delay After Fukushima, REUTERS
(Aug. 11, 2011, 1:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/11/us-utilitiesnuclear-idUSTRE77A2N720110811.
129. Cooper & Sussman, supra note 112; see also Matthew L. Wald, Staying the Course,
Post-Fukushima, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2011), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/
10/staying-the-course-post-fukushima/.
130. Jessica Rettig, Japan’s Nuclear Crisis Reignites Safety Debate, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Mar. 21, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/03/21/japans-nuclearcrisis-reignites-safety-debate (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Despite such doubts, the overall approach to nuclear power in
the United States remains largely unchanged in Fukushima’s
aftermath. Spurred by the need for action on climate change, calls
for expanded nuclear capacity in the United States had been growing
for years. After Fukushima the calls did not disappear, but the
possibility that they would bear any fruit seemed increasingly
improbable. At the same time, nuclear was hardly going away.
“Without nuclear power,” Tennessee Senator Lamar Alexander
argued, “it is hard to imagine how the United States could produce
enough cheap, reliable, clean electricity to keep our economy
moving.”131 Prognosticating about nuclear power’s future, Professor
Robert Shrum perhaps put it most aptly: “This is not the end of
nuclear power but the end of the fantasy that a nuclear deus ex
machina can redeem our energy economy from dependence on
foreign oil.”132
Steady as she goes, indeed.
C. Japan
If the German and American reactions to Fukushima were,
respectively, an about-face and a slight nudge toward more caution,
the Japanese response was one of reconsideration and reassessment.
Somewhat ironically, this path of careful weighing and planning
came about at least in part as a result of the sharp seesaw of Japanese
politics.
Japan’s initial reaction to Fukushima in many ways mirrored
Germany’s vitriol. After the accident, the Japanese public solidly
disfavored the energy source. One newspaper poll showed seventyfour percent of Japanese supporting the phaseout of nuclear power
post-Fukushima, while another sixty percent expressed little or no
confidence in the safety of the technology.133 For a nation that long

131. Green, supra note 117 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Steven F. Hayward, After Japan’s Disaster, Will Nuclear Energy Have a Future in
America?, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/7antox3 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Professor Peter Bradford put it even more bluntly: “One can say that
Fukushima is making absolutely no difference in [the] picture. The ‘nuclear renaissance’ in
America was taking on almost every feature of a collapsing bubble even before March 11.”
Bradford, supra note 71.
133. Peter Drysdale, Japan’s Energy Options After Fukushima, E. ASIA F. (Sept. 5, 2011),
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/05/japans-energy-options-after-fukushima/.
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had relied on nuclear energy as a chief source of electricity, this
represented a “profound reversal of [public] sentiment.”134
It was this newfound public opposition to nuclear power that, in
part, spurred then-Prime Minister Kan to announce in Fukushima’s
wake that the nation would move away from—and ultimately
eliminate—its use of nuclear power.135 This, too, was a sharp turn for
national policy. Less than a year before the tsunami struck, Japan had
approved a “Basic Energy Plan” that anticipated the construction of
fourteen new reactors, representing an increase in reliance on nuclear
energy from thirty to fifty percent by 2030.136 Yet after Fukushima,
Kan suggested that the nation must “start from scratch” on a new
energy policy, because nuclear energy no longer had a place in
Japan’s energy mix.137 This announcement, however, came as a
surprise, leading some officials on Kan’s cabinet to express
disagreement with the Prime Minister’s position.138 Ultimately, Kan
was forced to clarify that his announcement of a nuclear phaseout
was a “personal” preference, not an official governmental policy.139
Meanwhile, other reactors across the country were shut down so
they could undergo stress tests to ensure their safety postFukushima. Combined with those facilities already undergoing
regularly scheduled maintenance, this left only twelve of Japan’s fiftyfour nuclear power plants in operation.140
To make up for this gap in power production, the Japanese
government instituted setsuden, or energy conservation measures,
throughout the summer. Industrial production schedules were
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Id.; Peter Fairley, Japan Faces Post-Fukushima Power Struggle, IEEE SPECTRUM
(Aug. 2011), http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/solar/japan-faces-postfukushima-powerstruggle.
137. Drysdale, supra note 133 (internal quotation marks omitted).
138. See Kan’s Nuclear Phase-out Plan Draws Anger over Lack of Details, Talks, ASAHI
SHIMBUN (July 14, 2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/
AJ201107144468; Kan Says Call to End Nuclear Power Was Only a Personal View, ASAHI
SHIMBUN (July 15, 2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/
AJ201107154682.
139. Fukushima to Scrap Nuclear Plants, JAPAN TIMES, July 16, 2011,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110716a4.html.
140. Drysdale, supra note 133; see also Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Courts the Money in
Reactors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/6nwfnch (“Only about one in five
of Japan’s 54 reactors . . . is still in service. The rest were damaged by the tsunami, are still
being put through routine tests, or have not been restarted after such tests because of local
opposition.”).
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shifted from weekdays to nights and weekends. Families voluntarily
unplugged their heated toilet seats and limited air conditioner use.
And large businesses were required to cut electricity consumption by
fifteen percent.141 As a consequence, Tokyo’s peak electricity
consumption fell from sixty gigawatts (“GW”) the year before to
forty-nine GW in the summer of 2011.142 Combined with the good
fortune of a relatively cool summer, this meant that blackouts, which
had been widely expected, never occurred.143
As the summer waned, however, the public’s continued
displeasure with the Japanese government, including its response to
Fukushima, mounted, and Prime Minister Kan resigned. It did not
take long for the government to shift course again. Kan’s
replacement, Yoshihiko Noda, announced, in his first speech to the
nation as Prime Minister, a more nuanced approach to nuclear
energy than the one previously proposed by Kan. Noda suggested
that no new nuclear facilities would be built, but that existing plants
would continue to be utilized. Moreover, long-term Japanese use of
nuclear power would be reduced—but not eliminated altogether.
“To build new reactors is unrealistic,” Noda said, “and we will
decommission reactors at the end of their life spans. . . . But it is also
impossible to immediately reduce our dependence to zero.”144 As for
the dozens of reactors that had been offline since the crisis in
Fukushima, Noda noted that they would be restarted, but only after
their safe operation was assured. “We will move ahead with restarting
those nuclear plants whose safety has been thoroughly checked and
confirmed, and with the condition that a relationship of trust is built
with the local communities.”145
141. Bright Ideas Needed, supra note 49, at 65; Joshua Meltzer, After Fukushima: What’s
Next for Japan’s Energy and Climate Change Policy? 2 (Sept. 7, 2011) (unpublished paper),
available at http://tinyurl.com/ 7jy7uww. For more on setsuden, see, for example, Suvendrini
Kakuchi, Energy-Saving ‘Setsuden’ Campaign Sweeps Japan After Fukushima, GUARDIAN (Aug.
22, 2011, 7:24 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/aug/22/energysaving-setsuden-japan-fukushima; Yoree Koh, Summer’s Over: ‘Setsuden’ Summer, That Is,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/09/13/summersover-setsuden-summer-that-is/.
142. Bright Ideas Needed, supra note 49, at 65.
143. Id.
144. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Leader to Keep Nuclear Phase-Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2,
2011, http://tinyurl.com/877ksrv (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Idled Nuclear Plants Will Be Restarted: Noda, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, at 5,
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2011/09/14/2003513256
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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This time around, the Prime Minister’s stated policy was echoed,
not undermined, by cabinet officials. The new Environment
Minister, Goshi Hosono, who is also responsible for overseeing the
cleanup and compensation effort surrounding Fukushima, reiterated
the policy of restarting existing power plants, albeit cautiously. “I’ve
been suspicious of the nuclear policy we have had, especially after
March 11. I don’t intend to allow the reactors to be restarted one
after another. I’m going to step on the brakes.”146 Hosono also
urged creation of a new agency under the rubric of Japan’s
Environment Ministry to regulate the nuclear industry, as opposed
to the extant model of using an agency within the nation’s Ministry
of Economy, Trade and Industry, which is responsible for promoting
nuclear power, to do the job.147
Even more critically, Hosono suggested that the nation’s energy
plan would need to be revised to reflect a reevaluation of nuclear
power’s appropriateness. “We will have discussions at various levels
and come up with the best mix of energy sources (to ensure a stable
supply),” Hosono said. “How much we will reduce the use of
nuclear power and when we will do so are among the issues that will
be discussed.”148 Prime Minister Noda likewise sounded this refrain,
noting that in the aftermath of Fukushima it is important for the
Japanese government to retreat, reassess, and only then decide the
best course for the future: “There will be a continuing necessity to
secure nuclear energy that is safe and more reliable. . . . We will
release a best energy mix shortly.”149
IV. ENERGY LAW: ONE METAPHOR, TWO CONCEPTIONS
Taken together, the German, American, and Japanese responses
to Fukushima convey a sense of how governments react to energy
146. Setsuko Kamiya, Hosono to Reshape Nuclear Policy, JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110913f1.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Id.; see also Osnos, supra note 17, at 54 (discussing agency capture of the trade
ministry by the Japanese electric and nuclear industries); Hiroko Tabuchi, Cooling Problem
Shuts Nuclear Reactor in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/05/world/asia/cooling-problem-shuts-nuclear-reactor-in-japan.html (noting that
the governor of the prefecture of Saga “rescinded his permission” to restart two reactors there
post-Fukushima when it was discovered that “Kyushu Electric had tried to manipulate public
opinion with fake e-mails to support” the reactors’ reopening).
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Noda to Stress Need for Nuclear Plants at U.N., JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20110919x3.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
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disasters—of how energy law is shaped by, or is resilient to change
from, the calamities that reveal the end results of an energy policy’s
aims. In these responses and others before them, concerns about
environmental and public health risks play a role. That role, however,
is not a leading one. It is at best a supporting role, sometimes even a
bit part, a part that ultimately succumbs to energy law’s bigger,
overarching objectives. For at its core, United States energy policy is
not about environmental protection and public health.
Fundamentally, American energy law is about providing a stable
supply of energy, in an abundant amount and at the lowest price
possible.150
Energy disasters offer a chance to reevaluate energy law’s
prevailing goals. By showing the negative, calamitous consequences
that pursuing those goals can lead to, disasters might make us as a
society pause and reflect on whether, in light of events like
Fukushima, Deepwater Horizon, the Upper Big Branch Mine, or the
Exxon Valdez, the current course of our energy policy is the right
one.151 As Professor Zygmunt Plater aptly observed in the context of
the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
The question for national energy law and policy now is whether,
this time around, we will acknowledge and implement the lessons
for hard systemic change largely avoided two decades ago. There
are many promising areas for reform, . . . [but the] Deepwater
Horizon tragedy will be a doubly disastrous occasion if it does not
produce systemic changes for the future, as the Exxon Valdez spill
markedly failed to do. As White House Chief of Staff Rahm
Emanuel said in another context, “You never want a serious crisis
to go to waste.”152

150. Again, nuclear power is a perfect example of this, as it was promoted, at least
symbolically, as “too cheap to meter.” Abundant Power from Atom Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1954, at 5 (quoting Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman, Atomic Energy Comm’n, Address at the
Twentieth Anniversary of the National Association of Science Writers (Sept. 16, 1954)).
151. Cf. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 91, 113 (2011) (“In times of catastrophe, political discourse is much more likely to take
a punitive tone. . . . But thankfully, environmental disasters—at least of the sort that dominate
headlines—are uncommon. Lesser environmental crises, of the sort that are constantly
unfolding all around us, tend not to produce policy outcomes of this punitive variety.”).
152. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, The Exxon Valdez Resurfaces in the Gulf of Mexico . . . and the
Hazards of “Megasystem Centripetal Di-Polarity,” 38 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 391, 396
(2011).
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Contrary to this possibility of transformation, however, energy
disasters in the United States generally have not caused the kind of
reflection and drastic course correction Professor Plater advocates.
True, events like Love Canal, Three Mile Island, and the burning of
the Cuyahoga River helped galvanize the environmental
movement—symbolically at least153—in turn playing a role in
environmental law’s “republican moment” of the late 1960s and
early 1970s.154 Environmental law long has held disasters out as
talismans for action, change, and legal revolution. Overall, however,
energy disasters have tended to produce results much like what
Fukushima appears poised to yield: incremental ones. The Exxon
Valdez disaster helped tighten liability for oil spills, but it did not
lessen our dependence on oil.155 The events following the explosion
of Deepwater Horizon caused President Obama to halt offshore
drilling, but in the face of intense political pressure, that ban too
quickly faded.156
Focusing on disasters to shift the law’s broad sweep, moreover,
can be dangerous. The constant need for an unending supply of
disasters makes more troubling but less obvious problems appear less
critical than they actually are. Requiring everything to sound in
disaster in order to garner attention risks diluting the truth of when
legal change is actually needed, especially if purported “disasters”

153. See Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History of
Environmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 89, 91 (2002).
154. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental
Command and Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 212 (2001).
155. See, e.g., Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After
the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 (2009); Jules Lobel & George
Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in Foreign Policy and
International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1075 (2005) (“The Exxon Valdez oil spill
. . . was one of the worst environmental disasters in American history, inciting a nationwide
public protest, a massive volunteer effort to assist in clean up, and the passage of the Oil
Pollution Act . . . .”); Noël Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending
the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases,
21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 330 (2002) (“Congress swiftly enacted the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 in response to the massive spill of approximately eleven million gallons of oil into
Alaska’s Prince William Sound from the Exxon Valdez, which has been widely viewed as one of
the worst environmental disasters in history.”).
156. Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to
Be a Law, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 11 (2010); Peter Baker & John M. Broder, White House
Lifts Ban on Deepwater Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/us/13drill.html.
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turn out not to be. And overemphasizing disasters gambles with
energy policy’s future—pushing the law in ways that are neither
optimal nor efficient, in directions attuned more to the flashy than
the essential. As Professor Jim Rossi has astutely observed,
“Legislation in reaction to a crisis . . . does not guarantee the public
a comprehensive, sound, and sustainable energy policy.”157
This is as true for nuclear energy policy as it is for other areas of
energy law, despite the enormous risks that the use of atomic power
presents. It can be seen, indeed, in how the United States, Japan,
and even Germany responded to Fukushima’s demise.
U.S. regulators, as noted, seized on improving safety postFukushima—specifically, to avoid the exact problems that TEPCO
encountered and their possible corollaries in U.S. plants.158 The
NRC task force’s recommendations, for instance, urged regulations
to account for a prolonged total loss of station power at nuclear
facilities, to anticipate the possibility of multiple natural disaster
events, and to assure that there will not be venting problems with
the reactor type used both in Daiichi and here in the United States,
the GE Mark I.159 These recommendations said nothing about what
nuclear power’s role in the United States should be after Fukushima.
Even in the face of a tragedy as horrific as this, U.S. regulators and
policymakers appear to have followed the traditional American path
for responding to disasters. They have resisted the temptation to
make big, long-lasting changes in response to a high profile event.
The Japanese response revealed a similar paradigm, though
perhaps somewhat less pointedly. Attempting a Merkel-like
maneuver to use an anti-nuclear stance to preserve his own political
power, Prime Minister Kan declared the end of atomic energy in
Japan after Fukushima.160 Yet this did not last. Kan was ousted, and
his successor took a far more measured approach. Nuclear utilization
may not grow in Japan, new Prime Minister Noda acknowledged,
but it was not going away either.161 For a heavily populated island

157. Jim Rossi, Lessons from the Procedural Politics of the “Comprehensive” National
Energy Policy Act of 1992, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 195, 239 (1995).
158. See supra Part III.B. Perhaps this should not be surprising. It is not uncommon,
after all, that a “big accident becomes a laboratory for studying how to prevent the next one.”
Osnos, supra note 17, at 52.
159. See supra notes 123–127 and accompanying text.
160. See supra Part III.C.
161. See supra Part III.C.
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nation lacking sufficient indigenous energy resources, nuclear power
simply plays too important a role in electricity supply to just recede
away.
Even in Germany’s anti-nuclear response, some resistance to
transforming the law’s path in reaction to a single event came
through. True, the German government seized on Fukushima as a
chance to eliminate nuclear power from the scene,162 but that was
hardly the end of the story. Germany was able to make this choice
only because of its surging renewable energy production163 and
because, prior to making the decision, it boasted substantial excess
generation capacity that it exported to other parts of Europe.164 With
the nuclear ban in place, those exports went away; blackouts became
a real threat that could not just be brushed aside; huge infrastructure
investments became immediately necessary; and stopgap measures to
bide time—including relying on nuclear power from other nations—
became unavoidable.165 Germany was willing to make this gamble,
but there were no illusions that it was not rolling the dice.
What explains the heavy resistance to fundamentally altering the
law in response to headline-grabbing energy disasters? There is a
common thread running through each of these nation’s reactions to
Fukushima: the critical role that supply stability, its abundance, and
economic performance play in energy policy. To a large degree, this
is why the United States, with nuclear energy constituting nearly
twenty percent of its generating portfolio,166 did not meaningfully
weigh phasing nuclear energy out. It is why in Japan, with a thirty
percent nuclear electric fleet,167 Prime Minister Noda so quickly
reversed Prime Minister Kan’s stance. It is why in Germany Jürgen
Grossmann called the nation’s nuclear ban an “experiment on
ourselves.”168

162. See supra Part III.A.
163. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
164. See Helen Pidd, Germany to Shut All Nuclear Reactors, GUARDIAN (May 30, 2011,
2:18 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/30/germany-to-shut-nuclearreactors.
165. See Germany Could Restart, supra note 108; supra text accompanying note 110.
166. Energy Info. Admin, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Electricity in the United States,
EIA.GOV (July 21, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/3lyuzsa.
167. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Premier Wants Shift Away from Nuclear Power, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2011, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/
14japan.html.
168. Rosenthal, supra note 77, at A1.
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These three nations’ respective responses to Fukushima thus
expose a larger truth about energy law and policy itself. They do so
through the perspective of nuclear energy. Admittedly, the atomic
lens yields a distorted image. It is skewed by numerous factors that
are not present, or are not nearly as prominent, in other energy
realms.169 Nevertheless, the nuclear view of energy policy lays bare a
dominant trait of virtually every aspect of U.S. energy law: assuring
energy supplies, as an overarching objective of energy policy, tends
to reign. Even in disasters as dramatic as Fukushima, with the world
watching on live television as one percent of the global nuclear

169. Nuclear power, for instance, packs heavy historical baggage. Its use conjures heavily
symbolic images of its origins: flashing explosions in the dead night of the American West’s
deserts, downwinders and Native Americans burdened by those tests and the extraction of
uranium for them, and mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. See generally, e.g.,
MICHAEL A. AMUNDSON, YELLOWCAKE TOWNS: URAINUM MINING COMMUNITIES IN THE
AMERICAN WEST (2002); STEPHANIE COOKE, IN MORTAL HANDS: A CAUTIONARY HISTORY
OF THE NUCLEAR AGE (2009); THE ATOMIC WEST (Bruce Hevly & John M. Findlay eds.,
1998); CHIP WARD, CANARIES ON THE RIM: LIVING DOWNWIND IN THE WEST (1999); John
M. Findlay, The Nuclear West: National Programs and Regional Continuity Since 1942, 24 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (2004); Don Hancock, The Nuclear West: Which Road to the
Future?, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 29 (2004). As Fukushima itself makes clear,
nuclear power also presents environmental and health risks on a scale unimaginable for other
energy sources. And nuclear’s silence and invisibility complicate the picture: neighbors of a coal
plant may not know what precisely the smoke billowing from the facility will do to their health,
but they can see it. Radiation cannot be comprehended in the same way. See generally SPENCER
R. WEART, NUCLEAR FEAR (1988). See also Jorge Contreras, In the Village Square: Risk
Misperception and Decisionmaking in the Regulation of Low-Level Radioactive Waste, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 500–03 (1992) (noting fear of radioactivity generally); Amanda Leiter,
The Perils of a Half-Built Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting Majorities, and the Nuclear Power
Debate, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 31, 48–63 (2008) (assessing the role that risk perception might
play on the utilization of nuclear energy technology). At the same time, nuclear power also
lacks, or lacks in pertinence, concerns critical for other energy sources. Despite its potentially
catastrophic consequences, the nuclear industry boasts a safety record that is the envy of other
energy producers. E.g., JOHN M. DEUTCH ET AL., UPDATE OF THE MIT 2003 FUTURE OF
NUCLEAR POWER: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 10 (2009), http://web.mit.edu/
nuclearpower/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR ENERGY
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ROADMAP vi (2010), http://nuclear.gov/pdfFiles/
NuclearEnergy_Roadmap_Final.pdf. It has a smaller land consumption footprint than other
energy sources. Clinton J. Andrews, Does the Fukushima Accident Significantly Increase the
Nuclear Footprint?, ELECTRICITY J., July 2011, at 36, 39 (“[A]lthough nuclear is still ahead in
the land-intensiveness game, its lead may not last. One more major accident in the next 20
years is all it will take to make nuclear as land-intensive as solar . . . .”). It likewise has earned
the moniker of a “clean” energy source, at least in many camps, because of its meager climate
change impacts. See generally, e.g., Fred Bosselman, The Ecological Advantages of Nuclear
Power, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007); Bentley Mitchell, Note, Diffusing the Problem: How
Adopting a Policy to Safely Store America’s Nuclear Waste May Help Combat Climate Change,
28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 375 (2008).
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capacity goes up in smoke, supply’s dominance in energy policy
shines through.
To understand how controlling this policy goal can be, deeper
examination of the idea of supply in energy law is necessary. To
embark on this exploration, a metaphor, and two ensuing
conceptions of U.S. energy law, prove useful.
A. A Metaphor
The very idea of nuclear energy provides a helpful metaphor for
considering energy law and its conventions. Although, as with any
metaphor, the equation of nuclear power with energy law is not a
perfect one, this metaphor does offer an effective way of simplifying,
and thus thinking about, both how energy law operates and what
critiques are lodged against it.
In severely oversimplified terms, nuclear energy works this way:
Enriched uranium pellets are loaded into thin metal rods. Those rods
are then organized into a reactor core, typically hexagonal or
rectangular in shape. Inside the reactor core, neutrons strike
uranium-235 atoms, which then split the atoms into lighter elements
and more neutrons. The released neutrons then strike other atoms,
perpetuating the cycle: a chain reaction.170 Importantly, this reaction
also releases energy in the form of heat, which is used to warm water
that, in turn, spins a turbine to create electricity.171 Control rods
made of boron, cadmium, and other materials that absorb neutrons
are lowered and raised in and out of the core to control the speed of
the chain reaction.172
Energy law itself might be thought of in terms of a nuclear
reactor’s function. In this metaphor, the reactor’s fuel is energy law’s
driving force: the field’s normative goals and policy objectives. The
electricity produced by the reactor is the effect of how energy law is
carried out: the field’s impact on society. And the control rods,
which limit how quickly the reactor’s chain reaction occurs, are the
constraints that energy law faces: the limits placed on the field’s goals
by other legal disciplines and political influence.
170. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Nuclear Explained, EIA.GOV (June 6,
2011), http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nuclear_home.
171. Id.
172. Id. For a pictorial representation of the process, see Energy Info. Admin., U.S.
Dep’t of Energy, Nonrenewable: Uranium (nuclear), EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/kids/
energy.cfm?page=nuclear_home-basics (last visited Dec. 1, 2011).
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This representation of how energy law works, metaphorical as it
is, proves useful because it offers a way of considering the role that
disasters play in shaping our energy choices. Policy proposals,
including those inspired by disasters, may ultimately change the kind
of reaction that is happening in the power plant’s reactor core. But
in doing so, the proposal inevitably will be shaped by the fuel firing
that core. Unless the proposal changes the fuel itself, the power plant
continues to produce electricity in the same manner it always has,
through a radioactive chain reaction.
Different nuclear power plants use different mechanisms for
producing electricity, of course. The two dominant methods
employed in the United States are boiling water reactors and
pressurized water reactors.173 Challenges to the prevailing model of
energy law thus might also suggest not simply a change in fuel type
but also in reactor methodology—not only in substance but in
process too.
Part V takes up both types of critiques lodged against energy law
today—substantive and procedural. First, however, it is important to
understand how energy law functions.
B. Energy Law: A Simplified Conception
One, perhaps simplified, conception of how U.S. energy law
works is that its metaphorical reactor core is filled with three fuel
types: a trilogy of energy aims. They are for our energy policy to
achieve an (1) abundant, (2) secure, and (3) inexpensive supply of
energy. American energy policy often is expressed this way. “A
fundamental objective of U.S. energy policy,” Allan Wendt told
Congress twenty-five years ago, “is to assure an adequate supply of
energy at reasonable cost while avoiding undue dependence on any

173. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, REACTOR CONCEPTS MANUAL 1–10,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/teachers/01.pdf.
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single fuel or supplier.”174 In the quarter century since, little has
changed.
In this conception of energy law, the field’s three aims operate to
produce a mutually optimal result. That is, the reactor seeks to
maximize each of the goals simultaneously. If it cannot, then an
abundance of a supply tends to dominate, with price being
maximized secondarily and security third. Such an ordering might
occur where the three objectives of energy law compete—where, for
instance, one choice might yield a supply that is more abundant or
secure than another but that is also more expensive. Thus, policy
proposals in the field of energy law generally seek to maximize these
aims.175
Fukushima illustrates this. If the disaster at Fukushima is
considered (again, in oversimplified terms) to be the neutron that
starts the reactor’s chain reaction—in other words, a policy proposal
seeking to change energy law’s results—the effect it produces must
bear the marks of the reactor’s fuel. It will come forth only after
passing through the core’s controlling normative objectives.
Consequently, U.S. energy law’s incremental response to the disaster
is wholly unsurprising.176 For a U.S. system focused so heavily on
energy availability, proposals like Germany’s to eliminate nuclear
power would affect supply abundance too dramatically to have any
174. E. Allan Wendt, The Oil Market and U.S. Energy Security, 86 DEP’T ST. BULL 51,
53 (statement made before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Mar. 25,
1986); see also National Energy Strategy: A New Start: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Power of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 10 (1991) (statement of
Daniel Yergin noting national energy policy objectives of “cheap energy, secure energy, and
clean energy”); PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, INNOVATIVE POLICY SOLUTIONS
TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 9, available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/
energy_policy_brief.pdf (“While U.S. energy policy has many sources, forms, and influences, it
is nevertheless possible to identify four traditional objectives on which U.S. energy policy has
focused: (1) a secure, plentiful, and diverse primary energy supply; (2) a robust, reliable
infrastructure for energy conversion and delivery; (3) affordable and stable energy prices; and
(4) environmentally sustainable energy production and use.”); Michael W. Grainey, Recent
Federal Energy Legislation: Toward a National Energy Policy at Last?, 12 ENVTL. L. 29, 34
(1981) (“Among the Department of Energy’s responsibilities . . . [is] the assurance of an
adequate and reliable supply of energy at the lowest reasonable cost.”).
175. Cf. Chandler L. Van Orman, The National Energy Strategy—An Illusive Quest for
Energy Security, 13 ENERGY L.J. 251, 254 (1992) (“While energy security, which by definition
includes reasonable price maintenance, historically tops every administration’s list of national
objectives, the methods of achieving this nirvana have constantly shifted.”).
176. See, e.g., Amory B. Lovins, Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?, 55 FOREIGN AFF.
65, 65–66 (1976) (noting U.S. energy policy’s reliance on “incremental past practices” rather
than “long-term goals”).
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salience domestically. Instead, the kind of suggestions that tend to
prevail in the United States are those that do not harm supply at all,
and that foster greater security while raising price only marginally, if
at all.177 That, of course, is exactly what U.S. regulators have
suggested in Fukushima’s wake: make U.S. nuclear plants safer, so
they keep supplying electricity just as much as they do today.178
Manifestations of this simplified model can be seen at multiple
turns in American energy law. Utilities’ duty to serve is a foremost
example. Historically, the pact that utilities have made in exchange
for an exclusive service territory is to provide energy to any and all
customers in that area. The assumption is that the level of energy
demand in the territory is irrelevant because the supply the utility
provides will be abundant and secure. The law compels utilities to
abide by energy policy’s overarching objectives—including to assure
abundant power supplies. As courts have repeatedly held, “[T]he
term ‘public utility’ implies a public use, carrying with it the duty to
serve the public and treat all persons alike, without discrimination,
and it precludes the idea of service which is private in its nature,
whether for the benefit and advantage of a few or of many . . . .”179
Another manifestation of the model is unitization. Although the
law today leaves petroleum markets largely to their own devices,
177. See, e.g., Thomas C. Jepperson & Michael B. McGinley, The “Marketable Location”
Rule and Energy Policy Considerations, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 323, 326 (2004)
(“During the 1970s, chronic natural gas shortages led to an overhaul of federal energy policy
with the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) and the creation of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). One of FERC’s primary objectives was to
foster a competitive gas supply system . . . . Underlying this objective was the belief that if price
signals could be clearly and timely transmitted between buyers and sellers, market economics
would assure an adequate supply of natural gas to meet market demand.”); Joseph T. Kelliher
& Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611,
622 (2009) (“Energy policy seeks to assure that the United States has an adequate electricity
supply to meet the needs of consumers and a growing economy and that the price of that
electricity is just and reasonable. Energy policy may also encourage fuel diversity in our
electricity supply mix.”); Scott H. Segal, Fuel for Thought: Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents,
51 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 76 (2001) (“[F]ederal antitrust policy also underscores the objective of
protecting consumer welfare through maintaining adequate energy supply and reasonable
prices.”); David M. Smolin, The Paradox of the Future in Contemporary Energy Policy: A
Human Rights Analysis, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 135, 172 (2009) (“Conventional energy policy
seeks to facilitate an adequate supply of energy at a low price in order to facilitate economic
activity and growth.”).
178. See supra Part III.B.
179. Devon-Aire Villas Homeowners Ass’n, No. 4 v. Americable Assocs., Ltd., 490 So.
2d 60, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Higgs v. City of Fort Pierce, 118 So. 2d 582,
585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
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where it does interfere, it generally does so to amplify supplies. This
is the case with oil and gas unitization. Through unitization,
disparate ownership tracts overlying a common pool resource such as
oil or gas are treated as a single unit, with the royalties from
extraction divided proportionally. The idea is that managing the pool
as one will be more effective at extracting the resource than allowing
multiple entities to withdraw individually, which might reduce
overall field pressure and thus decrease the total amount of resource
ultimately removed.180 The idea, in other words, is to maximize
supply by avoiding waste. The Kansas Supreme Court has explained:
It is now common knowledge that this tired old world of ours, and
our country in particular, is faced with the frightening and
progressive energy crisis due principally to a shortage of petroleum
reserves. . . . Under these severe conditions we feel that it is
incumbent on all persons . . . to assist in the preservation and
conservation of our natural petroleum resources including
production methods which will minimize waste.
Pooling and unitization are basically conservation measures
adopted either by forced regulation in some states or by voluntary
agreement. . . . The primary purpose of unitized operations is to
permit proper and maximum development of the unit lands
without reference to ownership boundaries and with a minimum of
waste.181

A third example comes from a more recent change in energy law.
In the summer of 2003, approximately fifty million people in New
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Ontario lost power as a
result of cascading transmission and generation failures: an
unprecedented blackout.182 Partially in response to this event, the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”) gave the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) authority to oversee the
reliability of the United States’ bulk transmission system.183 Notably,

180. E.g., Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004
Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 277, 280–83 (2004).
181. Classen v. Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 617 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Kan. 1980).
182. See generally U.S.-CANADA POWER SYSTEM OUTAGE TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT
ON THE AUGUST 14, 2003 BLACKOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: CAUSES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (April 2004), https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf.
183. FERC regulates hydropower under Part I of the FPA and electricity rates under
Sections 205 and 206 of Part II. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 792–824w (2006).
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this bestowal of authority did not take place until eighty-five years
after Congress created FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission. That is, for nearly a century, federal electricity law
focused on other areas, including supply through hydropower
regulation and price through FERC’s control of just and reasonable
wholesale electricity prices.184 Only after a crisis forced transmission
reliability to the forefront did federal law take up the question of
transmission security. And then the response to the disaster of the
2003 blackouts was very much like that to Fukushima. Rather than
asking broader questions about the state of the nation’s transmission
system—including whether massive new capacity was needed or how
to solve the problem of siting lines in a NIMBY world185—the
authority granted by EPAct 2005 hewed closely to the proximate
cause of the disaster. It gave FERC power to certify an “electric
reliability organization” that would enforce operating standards, not
the authority to reassess the structure of the transmission system
altogether.186 Incrementalism prevailed.

184. See id. § 824p.
185. See generally, e.g., Steven Ferrey, JAMES A. HOLTKAMP & MARK A. DAVIDSON,
TRANSMISSION SITING IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES (2009), http://tinyurl.com/
743pmjx; Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate New Renewable
Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977 (2009); Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why
Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market Initiatives Are Insufficient to Improve the U.S.
Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 327 (2007); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of
Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009). “NIMBY”
refers to the “not in my backyard” phenomenon—that although everyone benefits from
facilities such as electrical transmission lines, no community prefers to have them sited locally.
Some critics of NIMBYism suggest that it is one factor causing the overburdening of minority
and lower income communities with environmental harms. See generally, e.g., Michael B.
Gerrard, The Victims of NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495 (1994).
186. The authority granted to FERC in the 2005 Act, however, is rather circumscribed.
One commentator has summarized:
To be sure, the law did not grant FERC plenary power to site transmission facilities
with no state involvement. The agency can only issue a siting permit in areas
designated as “National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors” by the
Department of Energy (based on transmission congestion) and then only if a state
where the transmission facilities are to be located either does not have authority to
approve their siting (or to consider the interstate benefits of the project), has such
authority but has withheld approval for more than one year, or approved the project
with unreasonable conditions.
Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and Regulation: A Look Back, 25
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 33 (2010); see also Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d
304 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, U.S. No. 09–343 (Jan. 19, 2010). This limited authority has
been cited as one impediment to clean energy development in the United States. In addition, a
recent decision by the Seventh Circuit, Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470,
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In these examples and others, energy law’s priority on supply
shines through. This simple conception of energy law thus appears to
answer the question of why disasters only nudge the law rather than
transform it. It also demonstrates how a focus on disasters as a
catalyst for legal change perpetuates that incrementalism: even
tragedies as striking as Fukushima can be “solved” by adding new
legal safeguards that address the specific issue that led to the disaster,
without ever weighing the root causes and systemic conditions that
made the disaster possible in the first instance.
What this model of energy policy does not answer, however, is
why the law does not focus on more abundant resources than those
that presently dominate our energy consumption. Renewable
resources such as the sun, wind, and waves are far more abundant
than any nonrenewable resource we use today. If supply is king, why
does the law not push society harder to harness these resources,
which offer both a more abundant and a more secure energy supply
than oil, gas, coal, and nuclear combined? To answer that question, a
slightly more complex conception of energy law is required.
C. Energy Law: A Fuller Conception
Two decades ago, Professor Joseph Tomain delineated this
competing, fuller conception of energy law.187 In his view, energy
law’s reactor core does not contain three fuel types but six. Tomain
posited that this “dominant paradigm” of energy policy does not
seek simply to maximize supply, price, and security in that order, but
rather, aims to maximize supply and price simultaneously—and that
it does so in a very specific way.188 As Tomain noted, energy policy in
the United States emphasizes established, archetype fuels and firms
as a way to ensure supply, abundance, and security. It then relies
primarily on markets to guarantee efficiencies in cost:
Domestic energy policy from the late nineteenth century to the
present is based on the fundamental assumption that a link exists
between the level of energy production and the gross national
product. . . . As a consequence, domestic energy policy favors

476 (7th Cir. 2009), has been singled out as an impediment to getting renewables onto the
grid. See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman et al., supra note 12, at 859.
187. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO.
L. REV. 355, 374 (1990).
188. Id.
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large-scale, high-technology, capital-intensive, integrated, and
centralized producers of energy from fossil fuels. These archetype
energy firms are favored over alternatives such as small solar or
wind firms because energy policymakers believe that the larger
firms can continue to realize economies of scale. . . . This belief
may or may not be true. Nevertheless, it persists . . . . Thus, the
dominant energy policy has the following general goals:
(1) to assure abundant supplies;
(2) to maintain reasonable prices;
(3) to limit the market power of archetype firms;
(4) to promote inter- and intrafuel competition;
(5) to support a limited number of conventional fuels (oil,
natural gas, coal, hydropower, and nuclear power); and,
(6) to allow energy
develop
within
system.189

decisionmaking and policymaking to
an
active
federal-state
regulatory

Plainly, Professor Tomain was describing how energy policy
actually functions, not what he would like it to become.190
Nevertheless, his conception of energy policy is important because it
explains the field’s lack of emphasis on renewables. Many of the
technologies that use those resources are not as well established as
fossil fuel technologies—they are not conventional fuels—and they
generally have higher marginal costs than incumbent facilities—so
they lose out to other options in the marketplace on which the
dominant paradigm traditionally has relied.
Tomain’s conception of energy law also is consistent with our
understanding of why disasters like Fukushima do not move the law
very far. In fact, his conception may offer an even better explanation
of this phenomenon than the more simplified version. As with the
simpler conception, the meltdown at Fukushima should not
fundamentally change energy law under Professor Tomain’s model,
because doing so would be inconsistent with the objective of
assuring a secure (here, already existing in the nuclear fleet) and
abundant (again, already existing in the provision of twenty percent
189. Id. at 374–76.
190. Cf. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, ENDING DIRTY ENERGY POLICY: PRELUDE TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 243 (2011) (“Our energy future no long resides in fossil fuels; it resides in a
substantial ramping up of energy efficiency and renewable resources.”).
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of American electricity) supply of power. Unlike the simpler model,
however, the model laid bare by Professor Tomain also helps explain
why, in the wake of Fukushima, Germany abandoned nuclear power
entirely and Japan at least weighed the option, but the United States
did not even put the option on the table. Ditching nuclear to go
heavily renewable as Germany did violates multiple additional pillars
of Tomain’s framework, including the tendency to rely on a few
conventional fuels and archetype firms. The simpler model lacks
these pillars. Culture, moreover, matters in shaping those pillars. The
energy culture of the United States is different than Germany’s; we
emphasize archetype fuels while they increasingly favor renewables.191
In Tomain’s fuller conception of American energy policy, in other
words, the German option is a chain reaction the U.S. energy policy
reactor cannot produce.
Still, the model described by Tomain does not account for a
growing area of energy law that, facially, appears to undermine this
six-pronged concept. In 1978, Congress adopted the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”),192 which affirmatively sought to
counteract the dominance of large, vertically integrated, incumbent
electricity suppliers and their reliance on traditional fuels. PURPA
required utilities to purchase power from smaller—and renewable—
generators at premium prices, referred to in the statute as “avoided
cost” rates.193 Likewise, since the 1990s, there has been an explosion
of state laws promoting renewable generation.194 These laws,
generically referred to as renewable portfolio standards, or “RPSs,”
compel electric utilities to provide a given percentage of

191. Germany has used an aggressive “feed-in” tariff to promote renewable energy for
years now. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. By contrast, the United States has
proposed a national renewable portfolio standard literally dozens of times—and never
succeeded in passing it. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1365 (2010); Mary Ann Ralls, Congress Got It Right: There’s
No Need to Mandate Renewable Portfolio Standards, 27 ENERGY L.J. 451, 452 n.11 (2006).
192. Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 2, 92 Stat. 3117, 3119 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of titles 7, 15, 16, and 30 U.S.C.).
193. 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(17), 824a-3(a).
194. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Is There a “Race,” and Is It “To the Top”?, 3 SAN DIEGO
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. (forthcoming 2011) (unpublished manuscript on file with author);
BARRY G. RABE, PEW CTR. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, RACE TO THE TOP: THE EXPANDING
ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 7 (2006), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/RPSReportFinal.pdf.
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their sales from renewable-based generators.195 Nearly three quarters
of states now have these laws on the books.196
PURPA and RPSs both seem like ill fits with Tomain’s
conception of U.S. energy policy. Both force adoption of more
expensive technologies. Both promote nontraditional fuels, often
from non-archetype firms. And both meddle in markets by changing
the decisions that utilities would make but for the laws. Do these
counterparts disprove his model?
One answer is that the model described by Tomain is too rigid
and that the simpler, three-part conception more accurately
encompasses the whole of energy law and the flexibility that such a
broad scope implies. Tomain’s model, in other words, might
accurately describe U.S. energy policy in some but not in all
instances. Given the intransigence of archetype fuels and energy firms
over the last 100 years, however, this explanation seems unlikely.
Despite laws like PURPA and RPSs, our nation continues to rely
heavily on fossil and other nonrenewable fuels.197 In that light, laws
like PURPA and RPSs come across more as anomaly than as
customary.
Returning, however, to the reactor core metaphor may offer an
alternate view that allows for Tomain’s conception to coexist with
renewables-promotion and other such energy laws that do not fit
perfectly within its six-pronged framework. Seeing the question this
way, laws like PURPA and RPSs are not traditional energy laws as
such. Rather, they represent a gradual evolution in modern energy
policy in which historical energy law aims have begun to meld with
environmental objectives.198 That is, these laws do not just try to
assure abundant, cheap, and secure supplies of archetype fuels but
demand also that environmental impacts be simultaneously

195. See, e.g., Cal. S.B.X1-2 (2001), amending CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §
399.15(b)(2)(B); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 7-703(b)(17) (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
62–133.8(b) (2011).
196. See RPS Policies, DSIRE (Feb. 2011), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/
summarymaps/RPS_map.pptx.
197. Lincoln L. Davies, Energy Policy Today and Tomorrow—Toward Sustainability?, 29
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 71, 75 (2009).
198. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 191, at 1390–96; Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425, 1447 (2010). See generally Lincoln L.
Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473
(2010) [hereinafter Davies, Alternative Energy]; Amy J. Wildermuth, Is Environmental Law a
Barrier to Emerging Alternative Energy Sources?, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (2010).
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mitigated. As Professor Jim Rossi has noted, the merger of “the
goals and regulatory tools [of] environmental and energy law . . . has
been occurring over the past thirty years.”199 Laws like PURPA and
RPSs are one reflection of this.
In this view, then, the fuller model still prevails. The reactor fuel,
so to speak, remains dictated by Tomain’s six-sided frame. It is only
that laws like PURPA and RPSs constitute some of the control rods
that are lowered into the core chamber to moderate the reaction.
They infuse additional policy goals that constrain, but are not part
and parcel of, the reactor fuel itself.
V. ENERGY FUTURES, NUCLEAR FUTURES:
CRITIQUES AND REFORMATIONS
Thinking of energy law in terms of a nuclear reaction that
produces an important social good—electricity—but that also risks
devastating consequences—meltdowns—offers another benefit. It
provides a platform for understanding the typology of both (1) the
critiques that have been lodged against U.S. energy policy and
(2) how the field might be reformed in light of those critiques. This
Part summarizes those critiques and suggestions for reform. It
concludes by returning to the example of Fukushima, assessing its
likely impact on nuclear energy in general and on energy law in the
United States specifically.
A. Critiques
The most prevalent critique of American energy law today is that
it is unsustainable. By focusing on primarily short-term economic
effects, the argument goes, energy law risks undermining the land,
resources, and social, natural, and economic systems on which we
rely. The critique is thus that energy law is short-sighted: that it
overemphasizes the here and now at the cost of our future. This
sustainability tack is the primary substantive critique on energy law.
In addition, there are procedural criticisms as well.
1. Substance
Putting it in terms of our running metaphor, the unsustainability
critique of energy law is that the reactor core is loaded with the
199. Rossi, supra note 198, at 1447.

1975

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/20/2011 3:08 PM

2011

wrong kind of fuel. The solution is to swap out the existing fuel,
comprised of the six-pronged dominant paradigm exposed by
Professor Tomain, with a new power source that emphasizes not
only immediate economic returns but also long-lasting human,
economic, and ecological health. Professor Gary Bryner cast the
choice this way:
If one begins with the assumption that economic growth is the
primary imperative in American politics . . . then one must simply
learn to live with and adapt to whatever ecological consequences
occur. However, if one begins with the view that ecological
sustainability is the primary political goal and a prerequisite for
every other activity, then energy policy must be shaped in ways that
are consistent with that overriding imperative.200

This unsustainability critique comes in two primary versions, one
environmental and one economic. At its broadest, the environmental
critique echoes the choice highlighted by Professor Bryner. It is that
our unquenchable energy appetite threatens the natural systems on
which we rely, yet energy law does little to reign in that appetite
while simultaneously failing to account fully for the costs the appetite
imposes on society.
This version of the critique is ubiquitous in the modern literature
and current political debates,201 most prominently in the form of calls
for climate change regulation.202 The critique, however, runs more
broadly than climate change alone, for as much as some might want
to make energy policy become climate policy, it is not. Energy
policy, whether “clean” or not, by necessity must remain much
broader than the single question of climate. As Professor Amy
Wildermuth recently observed,
The question [is] how we can craft an energy strategy that takes
into account both our energy needs and the environmental

200. Bryner, supra note 9, at 342.
201. See generally, e.g., TOMAIN, supra note 190; John C. Dernbach et al., Progress
Toward Sustainability: A Report Card and a Recommended Agenda, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS
& ANALYSIS 10,275, 10,278 (2009); Irma S. Russell, The Sustainability Principle in
Sustainable Energy, 44 TULSA L. REV. 121 (2008).
202. See generally, e.g., Ned Farquhar, Energy, Security, Climate: Converging Solutions, 29
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1 (2009); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Energy and
Environmental Policy for Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 655 (2010); Mark E. Rosen,
Energy Independence and Climate Change: The Economic and National Security Consequences of
Failing to Act, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 977 (2010).
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consequences of each energy source. Given that all energy begins as
a natural resource of some kind . . . it would make sense to attempt
to balance energy production’s environmental impacts with
questions of the energy’s cost and availability.203

The economic version of the unsustainability critique is that
energy law is inefficient. One way energy law might be inefficient is
by ignoring the long-term depletion of resources, and thus, not
preparing society for what is sure to be a very bumpy transition to
new fuels.204 The retort, of course, is that the market will correct
itself—that once fuels become sufficiently scarce, their price will
increase and the incentive to switch to (and to innovate) new
technologies that can counteract the trend will rapidly occur.
Nevertheless, advocates, for instance, of addressing peak oil205 insist
that the current system allows the intransigence of archetype fuels
too long, and that it extends their natural life through subsidies,
favoritism, and other mechanisms.206
Alternatively, the economic critique of energy law suggests that
the system is inefficient because it is too “large.” These arguments,
made famous by Amory Lovins, contend that our very energy
infrastructure should be reshaped to allow for smaller, more

203. Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 379 (2011).
204. See, e.g., Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost Decade (or Is It Three?): Developing the
Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Carbon Emissions and Administer Energy Markets,
88 OR. L. REV. 405, 431–33 (2009); Evan N. Turgeon, Triple-Dividends: Toward Pigovoian
Gasoline Taxation, 30 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 145, 150–55 (2010).
205. Peak oil can be defined as the point when “worldwide, long-term oil production will
follow the famous ‘Hubbert curve’ and thereafter inevitably decline.” Jacqueline Lang Weaver,
The Traditional Petroleum-Based Economy: An “Eventual” Future, 36 CUMB. L. REV. 505, 508
(2006). The debate over when peak oil will occur (or whether it already has) can be fierce, but
there is an emerging consensus that it is a problem that should be addressed. Cf., e.g., Joshua
P. Fershee, Struggling Past Oil: The Infrastructure Impediments to Adopting Next-Generation
Transportatoin Fuel Sources, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 87, 88 n.9 (2010) (“Although the concept of
Peak Oil is not universally accepted, ‘one must accept Peak Oil as a working hypothesis while
respecting the competing analyses that have been espoused by others.’” (quoting Richard D.
Cudahy, The Bell Tolls for Hydrocarbons: What’s Next?, 29 ENERGY L.J. 381, 387 (2008));
Diana M. Liebmann, Recent Developments in Texas and United States Energy Law, 4 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 363, 436 (2009) (“Peak oil is a hotly debated topic, but no matter
where one stands on this issue, there are reasons to expect that the supply in the U.S. will not
meet the growing pace of demand.”).
206. See generally, e.g., KENNETH S. DEFFEYES, BEYOND OIL: THE VIEW FROM
HUBBERT’S PEAK (2005); PAUL ROBERTS, THE END OF OIL: ON THE EDGE OF A PERILOUS
NEW WORLD (2005).
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distributed, “softer” energy paths.207 They suggest, among other
things, that we waste huge amounts of energy by moving it long
distances from central power stations to load centers, and that by
moving generation closer to home, the delivery of electricity would
be both less costly and more environmentally sensible.208 In any case,
they acknowledge that to pursue this kind of more efficient energy
system, we also need a different energy law—a new kind of reactor
fuel.
2. Procedure
Finally, some commentators have critiqued not only energy law’s
goals but also its process—not just of the reactor fuel itself but also
of the way the reactor produces electricity.
One emerging critique on this front is that energy law fails to
coordinate with environmental law as well as it should.209 In the
alternative energy context, for instance, energy law and
environmental law often work at cross-purposes.210 Advancing
renewable energy technologies simultaneously reduces pollution and
enhances energy security; if pursued more vigorously, it would
advance the objectives of both fields. Yet to a large degree, energy
law has failed to effect any real change on this front, the multiple
state efforts at promoting renewables through RPSs and other
measures notwithstanding. “[T]he fact that energy law and
environmental law promote different goals clearly has restrained the
adoption of more renewables. Both energy law’s focus on reliability
and its emphasis on cost temper any incentive that environmental law
might create for alternative energy production.”211
An undue emphasis on crises, or disasters, is itself another form
of the process-based critique of energy law.212 Energy law, like
environmental law, tends to be “reactive in [its] approach.

207. See generally AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE
(1977).
208. See, e.g., Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable Generation: The Trifecta
of Energy Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and Empower Ratepayers, 22
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2011).
209. See generally, e.g., Davies, Alternative Energy, supra note 198; Wildermuth, supra
note 198.
210. Davies, Alternative Energy, supra note 198; Wildermuth, supra note 198.
211. See Davies, Alternative Energy, supra note 198, at 502 (footnote omitted).
212. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 157, at 239.
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Environmental laws often ‘appear to be performing triage; they are
the equivalent of an emergency response to environmental problems,
an ER or Urgent Care.’ Likewise, energy law is often playing catchup with the latest crisis be it Enron or climate change.”213 By
focusing on crises and disasters, two deleterious effects may result for
energy law. First, the process employed can be too hurried,
potentially making the outcome achieved suboptimal. Second,
honing in on emergencies can skew the law’s vision, so that pressing
problems receive an inordinate amount of attention and those that
are in fact more critical—but slower-burning—are pushed to the
side. Certainly, the latter could be used to characterize Fukushima’s
impact on nuclear policy in the United States. It is likely that some
rules for reactor licensing and operation will change. That in itself is
not untoward; likely, quite the contrary. Despite these efforts,
however, more difficult problems remain—including forging a
solution for long-term nuclear waste disposal.214
B. Reformations
Addressing the critiques of energy law requires matching
solutions to infirmities. This applies to both substance and process:
the reformation demanded by the charge that energy law is
unsustainable is to make it more sustainable—to switch one fuel for
another. The change demanded by the critiques of energy law’s
process is to create a new process—not to swap out the reactor fuel,
but to alter the way the reactor makes electricity.

213. Wildermuth, supra note 203, at 381 (footnote omitted) (quoting Wildermuth,
supra note 13, at 149).
214. See, e.g., Hannah Northey, Court Reveals Timeline for Case That Could Affect Fate of
Repository, GREENWIRE (Nov. 7, 2011) (discussing status of litigation over the Obama
administration’s attempted withdrawal of the permit application for the proposed Yucca
Mountain high-level nuclear waste depository). See generally Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley
Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and the Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 331–32
(2009) (summarizing the dilemma of nuclear waste disposal and Congress’s reaction thereto
with passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Nuclear Waste Law
and Policy: Fixing a Bankrupt System, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 783, 804–09 (2008) (discussing
nuclear waste disposal challenges at Yucca Mountain); Cinnamon Gilbreath, Note, Federalism
in the Context of Yucca Mountain: Nevada v. Department of Energy, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 577
(2000).
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1. Sustainability
One obvious way to make energy law focus more on
sustainability is to replace its current short-term, economicallyfocused objectives with broader, longer-view aims. There are
multiple possible iterations of this option.
A “deep,” or bedrock-level, change designed to make energy law
more sustainable would be to elevate ecological sustainability and
make all other objectives subordinate to it. This is the version of
sustainability that Professor Bryner referred to when he argued for
making energy “decisions . . . driven by ecological preservation” and
then to “live with and adapt to whatever energy supplies and prices
result from those decisions.”215
At the other end of the spectrum is a weaker form of
sustainability, a kind of “sustainability lite.” Arguably, this is what
the “control rods” of environmental regulation already impose on
energy law, at least to the degree they actually capture the
externalities of energy production and consumption.216
Finally, in between these two poles is a middle ground—what
might be referred to as “mainstream” sustainability. Mainstream
sustainability, or “sustainable development” as it often is called, seeks
to maximize a “triple bottom line.”217 In environmental circles, this
typically is referred to as the “three Es”: environment, economy,
equity.218 In corporate realms, it is the “three Ps”: profit, people,

215. Bryner, supra note 9, at 342.
216. Cf., e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Fourth-Generation Environmental Law:
Integrationist and Multimodal, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 771, 874 (2011)
(noting that “[m]any of the [modern] developments towards integrationist multimodality in
U.S. environmental law are at the edges of environmental law, where environmental law
interacts or engages with other fields of law, policy, and collective action,” including energy
law).
217. See generally Ben Boer, Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: The
Roles of National, State, and Local Governments in Translating Grand Strategy into Action, 31
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 307, 317–19 (1995) (interpreting sustainable development); John C.
Dernbach, Sustainable Development: Now More Than Ever, in STUMBLING TOWARD
SUSTAINABILITY 45, 45 (John C. Dernbach ed., 2002) (defining sustainability).
218. See J. William Futrell, Defining Sustainable Development Law, 19 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 9, 9 (2004) (“For more than a decade the term ‘sustainable development’ has
denoted an effort to meld concerns for environmental protection, economic well-being, and
social justice.”); U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz.,
June 3–14, 1992, Promoting Sustainable Human Settlement Development, ¶¶ 7.1–.4, U.N.
Doc. A/ CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex II (1993) (identifying considerations in the
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planet.219 In either case, the core idea of sustainability is to advance
all three of the objectives over a long timeframe, creating prosperity
both now and in the future.
The objective of sustainable development . . . is to achieve a social
framework in which economy, environment, and equity all are
sustainable in perpetuity over all geographic scales. . . . It is not
sufficient merely to strike a balance between economy,
environment, and equity that brings the three into harmony for the
moment; rather, we must [do so] over time . . . .220

The advantage of substituting sustainability for energy law’s
current objectives is that it could lead to what energy law so far has
failed to obtain: true energy independence. For instance, a
sustainability-based energy law might push harder and faster toward
renewables. To the extent it did, both energy law’s current aims of
supply abundance and security, and the environmental goals of
better ecological protection, could be achieved. This, of course,
would require a major reorienting of energy policy. Rather than the
current prevailing paradigm, a new one would need to emerge. This
paradigm, which we might call an “alternative energy paradigm,”221
would borrow some pillars from the extant model but infuse ideas of
sustainability of its own. It might look like this:
1) Assure sustainable supplies of energy;
2) Maintain reasonable prices, based on real and
internalized costs;
3) Harness the power of archetype firms to overhaul our
energy structure and begin cultural change;
4) Promote a deliberate move to renewable energy sources,
based on hard science, not politics; and
5) Support competition among fuels.222
Indeed, a sustainability-based energy law would not measure
economic success on mere profits, but also on whether the energy
context of sustainable human settlement development).
219. E.g., PETER FISK, PEOPLE, PLANET, PROFIT: HOW TO EMBRACE SUSTAINABILITY
FOR INNOVATION AND BUSINESS GROWTH (2010).
220. J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 39, 43 (1999).
221. Davies, supra note 197, at 74.
222. Id. at 83.
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supplies and technologies it was delivering would last for the long
run. In this way, a sustainable form of energy law would also tend to
further the merger of energy law and environmental law, and thus,
potentially solve some of the process concerns raised about energy
law today. If the objectives of both fields were married into a unified
framework, they would no longer undermine each other.223
One problem, however, with injecting sustainability into energy
law is that it might make the decisionmaking calculus more complex.
Today, energy outcomes, or their general direction at least, are fairly
certain. If they do not comport with the dominant paradigm, they
are less likely to occur. Make sustainability the new model and the
results become more indeterminate. Just as there is an ordering
problem in the simpler, three-part conception of energy law—where,
for instance, supply abundance and price efficiency potentially stand
at odds—the same dilemma exists if sustainability’s triple bottom line
becomes the controlling paradigm. Indeed, disentangling all the
things that national energy policy is supposed to achieve, and
balance, is no easy task. As the Carter administration noted, energy
problems are “a complex tangle of sometimes competing national
goals—market efficiency and greater production, equity among
income classes and regions, environmental protection, national
security, economic growth, and inflationary restraint. It [is] difficult,
and sometimes impossible, to reconcile all these goals.”224
Should renewables be promoted because they provide a more
abundant long-term supply of energy, or should coal be utilized
more heavily because it has a higher energy value, is less expensive,
and thus frees resources that could be used on further research and
development for other technologies? Should tar sands and oil shale
be tapped because they are available domestically and are located far
from population centers, or are their environmental consequences
too great? Should more bulk-scale transmission be built, or should
we focus on transforming our energy infrastructure by promoting
smaller scale distributed generation projects? There are no easy
answers to these questions, whether framed in terms of sustainability

223. Davies, supra note 191, at 1390–96.
224. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-93-29, ENERGY POLICY: CHANGES
NEEDED TO MAKE NATIONAL ENERGY PLANNING MORE USEFUL 29 (1993) (quoting the
1979 national energy plan).
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or otherwise. Better energy law processes may help, although alone
they too may fall short of the task.225
2. Planning
Beyond moving energy law substantively toward sustainability,
another option would be to change some of the processes the field
now uses. Here, a key question is the role of planning.
Presently, energy law leaves many choices to free market
mechanisms. Even in the field of electricity, once heavily regulated
and dominated by natural monopolies, this has become the case.226
President Reagan finished off oil price controls,227 and the Clintonera FERC drove cost-of-service ratemaking to the periphery, for
wholesale power sales at least.228 Perhaps this was inevitable. The
dominant energy paradigm heavily favors markets after all. In any
case, the shift from cost-based to market-based regulation in energy
law is one that generally has been lauded for making the law more
225. Professor Robert Adler makes the parallel point in the water context. “A disaster
prevention strategy designed to reduce vulnerability to drought may require changes to deeprooted economic policies in the agricultural and other sectors of the economy. At the most
basic level, it will require us to rethink what conditions we consider a ‘disaster,’ as opposed to
the normal range of variability in weather and other conditions within particular regions.”
Robert W. Adler, Balancing Compassion and Risk in Climate Adaptation: U.S. Water, Drought
and Agricultural Law, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1809946. The same might be said about energy choices. Under the disaster lens, at
what point does the risk of another Fukushima outweigh the cost of climate change?
226. For accounts of deregulation—or restructuring—in the electric industry, see, for
example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 463–64 (2005); Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The
Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 781 n.70; Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study
in Government Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 829–37 (1998).
227. See Exec. Order No. 12,287, 3 C.F.R. 124 (1981); Joseph P. Tomain, Toward a
Sustainable Energy-Environmental Policy, in ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 6-1, 6-24 (2000) (noting that President Reagan’s action was “largely symbolic,
however, because [the price controls] were scheduled to terminate on October 1st of that
year”).
228. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999); Bernard S. Black &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S.
Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1343–48 (1993); Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1323, 1325 (1998); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767–69 (2008). On historic regulation of the electricity industry, see,
for example, Suedeen G. Kelly, Electricity, in ENERGY LAW AND POLICY FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 227, at 12-10 to -11.
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efficient, directionally at least if not in every execution of the general
plan. Today there are not widespread calls for this revolution’s
wholesale reversal.229
One possible counterpart to free markets, nevertheless, is careful
planning. Energy law already incorporates some planning. PURPA
encourages states to engage in integrated resource planning with
their utilities, so that truly least-cost options are chosen, demandside management is not ignored, and environmental concerns are not
overlooked.230 At a much broader level, the Energy Reorganization
Act requires a national energy plan to be prepared and submitted to
Congress biennially—a process that helps set our national energy
priorities, theoretically if not actually.231
There are, however, two clear deficiencies in this national
planning process. First, it has not been particularly effective. A 1993
study showed that no national energy plan prepared as of that date
had complied with the law’s requirement to set forth five-year and
ten-year objectives for energy supply and demand.232 Moreover, the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 modified the law. Following these
amendments, the plan cannot simply examine energy possibilities
holistically but must tilt heavily toward cost; it is compelled to
recommend the “least cost” resources for use.233
Second, this planning process has limited impact. It is process
and little more: it sets no binding mandates, it imposes no limits on
environmental effects or costs, and it is subject to the whim of the
prevailing political winds of the time. It also may be a rather hollow
process. At least one analysis revealed that virtually every national
energy plan has made similar recommendations, only ordered
differently from year to year.234 It thus should not be surprising that
229. This of course does not mean that the shift to market-based regulation in energy has
gone without criticism. Compare, e.g., Richard D. Cudahy & William D. Henderson, From
Insull to Enron: Corporate Re(regulation) After the Rise and Fall of Two Energy Icons, 26
ENERGY L.J. 35, 108 (2005) (calling electricity restructuring “on balance a success”), with
Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J.
1141, 1158 n.89 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005))
(deeming it a “fiasco”), and Robert Kuttner, Keynote Address, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 417, 421 (2008) (finding it a “palpable failure”).
230. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2602(19), 2621(d)(7) (2006).
231. Department of Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7321.
232. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 224, at 3.
233. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1602, 106 Stat. 2776, 2999–
3001 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13382).
234. Van Orman, supra note 175, at 264.
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some participants in the process have suggested that the steps of
making the plan are more valuable than the plan itself.235
This, however, could change. Energy law could mandate a highlevel, binding planning process that produces goals enforceable at
multiple levels of government. A new law could, for instance, use
nationally set and administered generation portfolio targets—much
like state-level RPSs do for renewables but for all classes of
generation fuels. This would make energy law’s objectives both
clearer and more comprehensive.236 Because the goals would have
actual effect, debate over what they should be and how they should
be carried out should be more robust. The use of this kind of
planning process would not dictate outcomes; the plan could
embrace the objectives of the existing energy paradigm or a more
sustainability-based one. It also could pursue efficiency, operating via
markets for each resource, so that each utility could employ the
generation mix most efficient and economically optimal for it.
In this way, energy law could achieve its objectives in a more
orderly, calculated, and measurable way. It would not by itself alter
the underlying objectives of the field, but it might make the process
of achieving those goals more efficient—and, because they are more
measurable, more effective too.
C. Fukushima’s Shadow: Nuclear Power and the Future of Energy Law
Only months before the tsunami struck Fukushima, two
observers of U.S. energy policy wrote this of nuclear energy’s future:
A serious accident at an existing nuclear plant—anywhere in the
world—would have a dampening effect on the public’s acceptance
of nuclear power plants. The new plants have safety features and
designs that greatly lessen or eliminate the chance of a catastrophic
accident, however, convincing the pubic of that fact could be
extremely difficult if there is another Three Mile Island or
Chernobyl.237

235. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 224, at 33.
236. Of course, the difficulty in transforming our national energy
with changing technology but with combatting the “deceptively
infrastructure as well. Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy:
ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 339 (2011).
237. Nancy A. Wodka & Salo L. Zelermyer, Using the Nuclear
Ground on Energy Policy, ELECTRICITY J., May 2010, at 19, 24.

landscape rests not just
difficult” problem of
By Whom?, 31 UTAH
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Their assessment was not an isolated one. Before Fukushima, many
concurred that the “nuclear renaissance” long anticipated in the
United States was unlikely to arrive anytime soon.238
After Fukushima, the future of nuclear energy is even more
uncertain.239 Six years ago, Joseph Tomain charted three possible
paths forward for the nuclear industry and, by extension, for energy
law itself.240 One path, he wrote, was of a “Promotional Nuclear
Policy”—a path in which the government affirmatively advocated for
and supported “the use of nuclear power over coal to generate
electricity.”241 The second path was one of a “Precautionary Nuclear
Policy”—a path that “emphasizes coal over nuclear power” because
it focuses so heavily on nuclear “safety including the disposal of
radioactive wastes and the avoidance of the various nuclear
catastrophes.”242 Finally, Professor Tomain argued for a “Smart
Energy Policy”—an alternative path to either of the nucleardependent options, a path that relies more on distributed generation,
emphasizes renewables and efficiency, and excises nuclear power
from the equation.243
Tomain readily acknowledged that both of the nuclear-reliant
futures he foresaw “accept the dominant model of energy policy with
its reliance on large-scale, capital-intensive energy producers.”244 His
suggestion was that the “Smart Energy Policy” leads toward a more
prosperous future in part because it abandons this prevailing
paradigm.
238. E.g., Is It Time to Abandon Talk of a Nuclear ‘Renaissance’?, ELECTRICITY J., Dec.
2010, at 1; Nuclear Costs: Clouded, but Rising, ELECTRICITY J., Oct. 2010, at 1; Steve
Thomas, Competitive Energy Markets and Nuclear Power: Can We Have Both, Do We Want
Either?, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 4903 (2010).
239. John Rowe, CEO of Exelon, the largest owner of nuclear facilities in the United
States, recently put the odds of a domestic nuclear renaissance at fifty percent. Hannah
Northey, Exelon CEO Says Renaissance Has ‘50-50’ Chance, GREENWIRE, Nov. 9, 2011
(“‘Most of us have spent our lives believing there has to be a nuclear revolution, and I still
think that’s a 50-50 possibility.’ . . . ‘Trouble is, it’s always 15 years away.’”); see also Keith
Bradsher, China Marches on with Nuclear Energy, in Spite of Fukushima, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2011, http://tinyurl.com/cnfpyfl (assessing the chance of nuclear expansion in different
regions); Stephanie Cooke, After Fukushima, Does Nuclear Power Have a Future?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2011, http://tinyurl.com/7taednw (same).
240. Tomain, supra note 2.
241. Id. at 237. In a later commentary, Professor Fred Bosselmann endorsed this path,
largely on environmental grounds. See Bosselman, supra note 169.
242. Tomain, supra note 2, at 237.
243. Id. at 246–48.
244. Id. at 237.

1986

DO NOT DELETE

1937

12/20/2011 3:08 PM

Beyond Fukushima

While the question remains of what will become of the U.S.
nuclear industry post-Fukushima,245 it seems unlikely that the
accident will foment a sea change in energy policy overall.
Fukushima instigated overhaul in Germany, but so far in Japan246—
and even more so here at home—the response has been much more
measured. It would be alarming if NRC regulation of existing and
new nuclear facilities is not amended and updated in some way as a
result of Fukushima. But a reformation of energy law as a whole
would be more remarkable still. At least on President Obama’s
watch, it seems clear we can count that out.247
Whether that result is salutary depends on perspective. Plainly,
American energy law and policy could benefit from an injection of
both reformed goals and modified processes. Nevertheless, achieving
this undoubtedly will be a long process. It is unlikely, Eric Freyfogle
wrote nearly two decades ago, that “Congress will . . . arise one
morning to reweave, deftly and coherently, the environmental
portions of the legal fabric.”248 It is equally unlikely that Congress
will awake one day to change out the entire fuel core of energy law’s
reactor. With all that energy touches in our economy, with the
human tendency to focus on the short-term, and with the role that
immediate results play in preserving political power, simply too much
is on the line.
What we might expect, then—what we might hope for—is not a
total shift in energy law but a gradual one. Certainly energy law and
environmental law are moving closer together, even if slowly. If
disasters like Fukushima have something to say about what that
merger should look like, or how quickly it happens, all the better.
Much of what environmental law aims to do is to calculate risks, as

245. As one observer put it, “[T]he Fukushima disaster handed no easy victories to either
side of the nuclear debate: defenders can no longer pretend to have engineered away the risks
of generating a billion watts in a concrete building, and opponents cannot easily suggest that a
meltdown will produce the huge number of immediate casualties that the public imagines.”
Osnos, supra note 17, at 61.
246. Id. (“By fall, a consensus had taken hold among Japanese politicians and
intellectuals: there would not be a sudden end to nuclear power in Japan. The country would
possibly close some of its oldest plants, but the rest—by one estimate, thirty-six of the fiftyfour reactors—would endure.”).
247. See supra Part III.B.
248. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Ethical Strands of Environmental Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
819, 846.
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difficult as that is.249 There is no reason why energy law should not
account carefully for those risks too.250
More narrowly, what Fukushima might teach us is that our
continued reliance on disasters as a heavy driving force for weighing
what energy law should be is not healthy. Disasters are a relevant
consideration in any area of the law, but they should not dominate.
There are many problems with focusing on disasters to encourage
legal change, least among them the reflexive reactions they can elicit.
How else can the multiplicity of “[h]asty [n]uclear [u]-[t]urn[s]”
that took place in Fukushima’s wake be explained251—first
Germany’s flip from extending the life of its plants to banning them
altogether, then Japan’s flop in declaring that it would phase out
nuclear energy, only to clarify that stance as a “personal” and not
political position, and only then to backtrack further to a posture of
wait and see? With all the drama they pack, disasters have a tendency
to push against reason, not just in the popular view of what
government should do, but in the appraisal of where and how
resources should be allocated in altering the law as well. In
Fukushima, we can see a partial answer to this problem.
U.S. energy law could use more planning. True, planning is
inherently imperfect. And true, a longstanding maxim of energy
policy is that all energy predictions end up wrong after the fact.252
Both points make potential overreliance on planning a warning
worth taking. They do not, however, justify foregoing the exercise
altogether. More planning in energy law could add significant
benefits to the system, including clarifying what our actual objectives
as a society are, measuring whether we are meeting those objectives,
specifying those objectives in terms of an ideal generating mix, and
involving the public in the process. Planning also could help assess
what role technologies—sometimes quite controversial ones—should
play in our energy future. By definition, this much more holistic
assessment would include the benefits and risks different energy
resources pose. Planning, in short, can be a partial response to the
sensationalism of disasters.
249. For one primer on risk assessment, see DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW
249–90 (2d ed. 2010).
250. Arguably, this is what the NRC licensing process does now for nuclear power.
251. Germany’s Hasty Nuclear U-Turn Likely to Come at a Steep Price, ELECTRICITY J.,
Aug.–Sept. 2011, at 3.
252. Bosselman, supra note 169, at 52.
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This kind of energy planning hardly would be a cure-all.253 But it
would be a step forward. In the shadow of Fukushima, at least that
much should be clear.
VI. CONCLUSION
A tragedy like Fukushima offers an opportunity to reassess—to
step back, take stock, and evaluate more broadly where, as a
community and as a society, we stand. For some, the perspective this
exercise offered was obvious. Germany, for one, took a hard turn in
Fukushima’s aftermath. For others, the view was murkier. In the
United States, Fukushima, if anything, appeared as a “grim reminder
of the calculated risk associated with nuclear power.”254 We take
great benefit from nuclear energy, yet the potential costs of those
benefits are, though rather remote, exceedingly high. Decades from
now, Fukushima will still be shorthand for that proposition.
Ultimately, Fukushima does not fundamentally alter the calculus
of the nuclear energy risk. The tragedy may shift perceptions, but no
nuclear facility built today—or on March 10, 2011, for that matter—
would use the design of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The critical
question thus is not simply what Fukushima means for the future of
the nuclear industry in the United States but what it means for the
future of United States energy law. Energy disasters should not be
the primary drivers of our law; that much is plain. But if we do not
use them as a chance to at least reconsider what our energy law
should be, they are a wasted opportunity indeed.

253. For an excellent critique of the deficiency of planning in environmental law, see
Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV. 265
(2009).
254. Chirag Rathi, A Pause in the Growth of Nuclear Energy, ELECTRICITY J., July 2011,
at 48, 52.
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